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Fair and Unfair Discrimination  
in Municipal Bankruptcy 
 
RICHARD M. HYNES* & STEVEN D. WALT** 
ABSTRACT 
Some bankrupt municipalities have proposed plans of reorganization that 
offer substantially greater recoveries to active workers and retirees than those 
offered to other creditors.  Because these greater recoveries are not mandated 
by a priority enjoyed by the active workers and retirees, a judge can only 
approve such a plan if it does not “discriminate unfairly” against a class of 
disfavored creditors that votes against the plan.  This Article describes the law 
defining the unfair discrimination standard, identifies the categories of 
circumstances in which discrimination between coequal classes is permitted, 
and argues that the claims of retirees and active workers do not fall into any 
of these categories.  The Article concludes that the current law does not allow 
a judge to approve a reorganization plan that provides retirees and active 
workers with a greater recovery. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Bankrupt cities and counties tend to have significant pension and other 
retirement obligations, but often times, very little money is set aside to pay 
such obligations.1  These cities and counties generally have offered a much 
more generous recovery on these claims than the recovery offered for bonds 
and other general unsecured claims.2  Until recently, the disfavored creditors 
 
 1. See, e.g., Robert Novy-Marx & Joshua Rauh, Public Pension Promises: How Big Are 
They and What Are They Worth?, 66 J. FIN. 1211, 1213–14, 1239 (2011). 
 2. See, e.g., Dan Fitzpatrick, Franklin, Calpers Clash on Stockton Pension Issue, WALL 
ST. J. (July 7, 2014), http://online.wsj.com/articles/franklin-calpers-clash-on-stockton-pension-
issue-1404772370 (reporting that the City of Stockton plans to pay some creditors less than 1% 
of their claims, while continuing to pay pensions in full); David Skeel, Op-Ed., Detroit’s Clever 
and Likely Illegal Art-for-Pensions Deal, WASH. POST (May 9, 2014), http://www.washington 
post.com/opinions/detroits-clever-and-likely-illegal-art-for-pensions-deal/2014/05/09/e3f93e84-
cf1e-11e3-a6b1-45c4dffb85a6_story.html (noting that Detroit’s plan would pay retirees 95% of 
their claims and bondholders 20% of their claims).  The bankruptcy of Central Falls, Rhode 
Island, stands as an exception to this rule.  In the Central Falls bankruptcy, the state legislature 
created a statutory lien that gave previously unsecured bondholders priority over the retirees.  
See Fourth Amended Plan for the Adjustment of Debts of the City of Central Falls, R.I., In re 
City of Cent. Falls, No. 11-13105 (Bankr. D.R.I. July 27, 2012), available at http://op.bna.com 
/bk.nsf/id/jhoz-8y3qp6/$File/CentralFallsFourth%20Amended%20Plan%20(7-27-12).pdf.  As  
a result, the bondholders recovered in full, while the retirees received just 55% of their 
pensions.  See id.; see also Richard M. Hynes & Steven D. Walt, Pensions and Property Rights 
in Municipal Bankruptcy, 33 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 609, 617 n.30 (2013). 
2
Campbell Law Review, Vol. 37, Iss. 1 [2015], Art. 3
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol37/iss1/3
2015] FAIR AND UNFAIR DISCRIMINATION 27 
did not object to their treatment.3  However, the municipal reorganization 
plans in Detroit and Stockton promised to pay pension and retirement claims a 
greater percentage than other unsecured claims with the same priority, and a 
number of creditors objected.4  Judge Rhodes approved Detroit’s bankruptcy 
plan over these objections,5 and Judge Klein has stated that he will approve 
Stockton’s plan.6  This Article argues that bankruptcy’s unfair discrimination 
standard prevents a municipality from granting workers and retirees a greater 
recovery than an objecting class of disfavored creditors.  Although political 
considerations may induce a court to construe that standard to permit a 
municipal reorganization plan to favor workers and retirees, current law does 
not allow it. 
If a municipality were liquidated under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy 
Code, the underfunded portion of the pensions would share pro rata with the 
other unsecured claims.7  However, municipalities cannot be liquidated in 
Chapter 7 or reorganized under Chapter 11;8 they are reorganized under 
Chapter 9.9  Chapter 9 borrows most of its rules from Chapter 11,10 the chapter 
that is typically used to reorganize corporations.  Although courts and 
commentators frequently recite a bankruptcy norm of equal treatment,11 
 
 3. See, e.g., Bobby White, Bankruptcy Exit Approved for City, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 6, 
2011), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB100014240531119038856045764864027785414 
50 (noting that the City of Vallejo’s largest creditors approved its plan of reorganization). 
 4. See Fitzpatrick, supra note 2 (noting Franklin Templeton Investment’s fight against 
Stockton’s plan); Mary Williams Walsh, Bond Insurer Syncora Claims Mediator Favors 
Detroit’s Retirees, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 12, 2014), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/08/12/big-
bond-insurer-syncora-files-objection-to-detroits-bankruptcy-plan/ (noting bond insurer Syncora’s 
efforts to fight Detroit’s reorganization plan). 
 5. Supplemental Opinion Regarding Plan Confirmation, Approving Settlements, and 
Approving Exit Financing at 169–81, In re City of Detroit, No. 13-53846 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 
Dec. 31, 2014) [hereinafter Detroit Supplemental Opinion], available at http://www.mieb.us 
courts.gov/sites/default/files/detroit/docket8993.pdf. 
 6. Transcript of Proceedings, In re City of Stockton, No. 12-32118-C-9 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 
Oct. 30, 2014) [hereinafter Stockton Transcript], available at http://www.stocktongov.com/ 
files/COS_Chapter9_ConfirmationHearingTranscript_2014_10_30_DRAFT_61pages.pdf 
(“[T]he Plan will be confirmed.”). 
 7. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 726(a)(2), (b) (2012). 
 8. Only “persons” may file under Chapters 7 or 11, and a municipality is not a person 
under the Bankruptcy Code.  See id. §§ 101(41), 109(b), (d). 
 9. See id. § 109(c). 
 10. See id. § 901(a). 
 11. See Howard Delivery Serv., Inc. v. Zurich Am. Ins. Co., 547 U.S. 651, 667 (2006) 
(looking to “the equal distribution objective underlying the Bankruptcy Code” in reaching its 
holding); Sampsell v. Imperial Paper & Color Corp., 313 U.S. 215, 219 (1941) (“[T]he theme of 
the Bankruptcy Act is equality of distribution.”); H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 177–78 (1977), 
reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6138 (“[T]he preference provisions facilitate the prime 
bankruptcy policy of equality of distribution among creditors of the debtor.”). 
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bankruptcy law recognizes many exceptions that give some creditors priority 
over others.12  None of these exceptions, however, give retirees priority over 
general unsecured creditors to justify the disparity in repayment that 
municipalities would prefer.13 
The reorganization plan determines the distribution to creditors within 
limits set by the Bankruptcy Code.  One limit is that of equal treatment.  The 
equal treatment norm states two different restrictions.  If two claims have 
equal priority and are placed in the same class, the plan of reorganization must 
provide equal treatment to each.14  Plans may discriminate between claims 
placed in different classes, however, as long as they do not “discriminate 
unfairly” against a class that votes against the plan.15  Although the precise 
scope of this latter restriction is unclear, nearly all courts and commentators 
agree that a dramatic difference in recovery (such as the difference between 
the recoveries enjoyed by the retirees and general unsecured creditors) at least 
creates a strong presumption of “unfair discrimination.”16  Nonetheless, some 
circumstances can justify a departure from bankruptcy’s norm of equal 
treatment of creditors with similar legal rights so that the discrimination is not 
unfair.17 
Existing justifications for discrimination do not support the favorable 
treatment that some reorganization plans propose for active workers and 
retirees.  This Article argues that such treatment is not the type of fair 
discrimination that is allowed by the Code.  One justification for 
discriminatory treatment is that some creditors would receive more outside of 
bankruptcy than others.18  This is not true when comparing retirees and 
bondholders.  A second argument is that a claim can fairly receive a higher 
return if the creditor holding the claim contributes to the reorganization.19  
This Article argues that a better understanding of these cases is that the debtor 
does not, in fact, discriminate in favor of a claim; rather, it compensates the 
creditor for the new value given.20  In any case, the contribution argument fails 
 
 12. See Hynes & Walt, supra note 2, at 613 (citing 11 U.S.C. §§ 506(b), 507(a)(1), 510(a), 
725, 1129(b)(2)(A)). 
 13. See id. at 617–38. 
 14. 11 U.S.C. § 1123(a)(4). 
 15. Id. § 1129(b)(1). 
 16. See, e.g., Bruce A. Markell, A New Perspective on Unfair Discrimination in Chapter 
11, 72 AM. BANKR. L.J. 227, 228 (1998) (arguing for a presumption of unfair discrimination if 
there is “either (a) a materially lower percentage recovery for the dissenting class . . . or 
(b) . . . an allocation under the plan of materially greater risk to the dissenting class”). 
 17. Id. (“The unfair discrimination in these situations is only presumptive.”). 
 18. Id. at 257–58. 
 19. Id. at 260. 
 20. See infra notes 66–82 and accompanying text. 
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on its terms.  It cannot justify the preferential treatment of retirees because 
they will not contribute to the reorganization.  Nor can it justify the treatment 
received by active workers because the payment is not reasonably tied to their 
contribution.21 
Most of the arguments made in support of a greater recovery for workers 
and retirees are normative.  They rely on neither the treatment that active 
workers and retirees would receive outside of bankruptcy, nor their 
contribution to a reorganization, but on their poverty and their inability to 
protect themselves prior to bankruptcy.22  These normative arguments are 
weak.  Involuntary creditors such as tort claimants can make at least as 
compelling a normative argument for special treatment, but there is no support 
in the existing cases or commentary for the claim that creditors should receive 
more on account of their poverty or their inability to protect themselves.23  
Still, a court might allow a plan to favor creditors it deems to be deserving or 
needy.  The court would be wrong to do so for two reasons.  First, in other 
contexts, the Supreme Court has resisted efforts of bankruptcy courts to seize 
on language in the Code that seems to grant them equitable powers to rewrite 
priorities in bankruptcy.24  Second, the argument that workers deserve more 
than other creditors is not as compelling as it might seem.25 
The above analysis assumes that a disfavored class of claimants votes 
against the plan.  A major creditor in Stockton’s bankruptcy, however, has 
made similar unfair discrimination arguments, despite class approval of the 
plan.26  It did so by trying to import unfair discrimination into another test—
that the plan must be proposed in good faith.27  This Article argues that this 
test is incorrect; Congress chose a class-based standard for a reason.  The 
creditor’s other arguments, however, have merit.  More specifically, this 
 
 21. See infra notes 64–119 and accompanying text. 
 22. See, e.g., Jack M. Beermann, Resolving the Pension “Crisis,” 41 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 
999, 1022 (2014) (discussing how government workers are less able to diversify pension risks 
than small investors who can diversify financial risks); Maria O’Brien Hylton, Central Falls 
Retirees v. Bondholders: Assessing Fear of Contagion in Chapter 9 Proceedings, 59 WAYNE L. 
REV. 525, 544–47 (2013) (arguing that bondholders can better bear the loss than retirees 
because the bondholders have insurance and can better diversify the risk of default). 
 23. See infra notes 154–202 and accompanying text. 
 24. See United States v. Noland, 517 U.S. 535, 543 (1996) (holding that courts cannot use 
equitable subordination to change priorities on a categorical basis). 
 25. See infra notes 189–202 and accompanying text. 
 26. See Summary Objection of Franklin High Yield Tax-Free Income Fund and Franklin 
California High Yield Municipal Fund to Confirmation of First Amended Plan of Adjustment of 
Debts of City of Stockton, California at 51–57, In re City of Stockton, No. 12-32118 (Bankr. 
E.D. Cal. Feb. 26, 2014) [hereinafter Franklin Summary Objection], available at http:// 
bankrupt.com/misc/Stockton_Plan_Franklin_Obj.pdf. 
 27. Id. 
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Article concludes that Stockton has sought to evade the unfair discrimination 
standard by abusing its power to classify claims, and that the plan does not in 
fact treat members of the same class equally.28 
Section I describes the existing understanding of the role of the unfair 
discrimination standard in bankruptcy reorganization.  Section II applies this 
standard to municipalities’ attempts to pay active workers and retirees more 
than general unsecured creditors.  Section III examines Stockton’s effort to 
evade this test through classification. 
I. THE ROLE AND CONTENT OF THE UNFAIR DISCRIMINATION 
STANDARD 
Under Chapter IX of the Bankruptcy Act,29 applicable until 1978, a judge 
could not confirm a municipal reorganization plan without the consent of each 
class of creditors.30  With the exception of the Detroit and Stockton 
bankruptcies,31 all municipal reorganization plans under Chapter 9 of the 
Bankruptcy Code have been confirmed with a unanimous vote by class.32  
However, Chapter 9 incorporates Chapter 11’s cramdown power.33  This 
power allows the judge to approve the plan over the objection of a class as 
long as the plan meets bankruptcy’s fairness standards with respect to that 
class.34  Bankruptcy law contains two tests for horizontal fairness in 
reorganization.  First, if the debtor places claims in the same class, either the 
claims must receive the same treatment, or holders of disfavored claims must 
consent to their inferior treatment.35  Because it requires equal treatment, this 
test ensures intraclass fairness in everything but name.36  Second, if claims are 
placed in separate classes, the plan cannot unfairly discriminate against a class 
 
 28. See infra notes 233–61 and accompanying text. 
 29. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 401–403 (1976) (originally enacted as Act of Aug. 16, 1937, ch. 657, 
50 Stat. 653, 657–58). 
 30. See id. § 403 (current version at 11 U.S.C. § 903 (2012)). 
 31. Two classes of claims rejected Detroit’s plan and Judge Rhodes explicitly invoked 
bankruptcy’s cramdown power.  See Detroit Supplemental Opinion, supra note 5, at 169–84.  In 
approving Stockton’s plan, Judge Klein stated that all impaired classes had approved the plan.  
See Stockton Transcript, supra note 6, at 37.  When the city’s attorney corrected him, noting 
that a class of tort claimants rejected the plan, Judge Klein replied that these creditors logically 
fit with the general unsecured creditors and did not conduct a cramdown analysis.  Id. at 42–43. 
 32. See Steven L. Schwarcz, A Minimalist Approach to State “Bankruptcy,” 59 UCLA L. 
REV. 322, 335 n.74 (2011). 
 33. See 11 U.S.C. § 901 (2012) (incorporating 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(1) by reference). 
 34. Id. § 1129(b)(1). 
 35. Id. § 1123(a)(4). 
 36. See In re Simmons, 288 B.R. 737, 747 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2003) (stating that the test 
provides a horizontal standard to fairness). 
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that rejects the plan.37  By its terms, this test ensures interclass fairness.  The 
same language prohibiting unfair discrimination appears in the other 
reorganization chapters as well.38 
Some commentators believe that the test for unfair discrimination differs 
depending on whether the debtor is reorganizing in Chapter 11 or in Chapter 
13.39  This Article disagrees.  The choice of bankruptcy relief has nothing to 
do with the requirement that the reorganization plan not unfairly discriminate 
against a class of claims.   Although the different bankruptcy chapters offer 
different types of relief for debtors, the standard of unfair discrimination 
applicable in those chapters remains the same.40  Similarly, the standard of 
unfair discrimination is the same across bankruptcy chapters, even though 
some chapters differ as to the party with standing to object to unfair 
discrimination.41  Finally, a limitation on the application of the standard in a 
chapter does not mean that unfair discrimination has a different interpretation 
in that chapter.42  The unqualified incorporation of the same “not discriminate 
unfairly” language into each of the reorganization chapters reinforces this 
conclusion.43  Case law also supports this conclusion, relying on 
 
 37. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(1). 
 38. See id. §§ 1222(b)(1), 1322(b)(1). 
 39. See Markell, supra note 16, at 244–46.  Judge Rhodes made a similar argument in the 
Detroit bankruptcy, stating that courts should apply a more lenient unfair discrimination 
standard in Chapter 9 because “the purpose of chapter 9 is to restructure the municipality’s debt 
so that it can provide adequate municipal services” and because “chapter 9 leaves the 
municipality in control of its affairs while facilitating its debt restructuring.”  See Detroit 
Supplemental Opinion, supra note 5, at 175. 
 40. See 11 U.S.C. § 1101 (reorganization); id. §§ 901, 1201, 1301 (debt adjustment). 
 41. Cf. id. § 1322(b)(1) (stating that a holder of an individual claim may object); id. 
§ 1129(b)(1) (stating that only a holder of a claim in a rejecting class may object).  Although a 
court might wish to consider the degree of creditor opposition as an evidentiary matter, this 
does not change the substance of the standard.  The 1978 Act radically changed the standing 
requirements.  See Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549, 2649.  
Under the Chandler Act, unfair discrimination objections were not restricted to claims in 
rejecting classes.  See Chandler Act of June 22, 1938, ch. 575, 52 Stat. 840, repealed by 
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978.  In fact, Chapter IX lacked a cramdown power; if a class voted 
against a plan, it could not be approved, regardless of how fair the judge believed it to be.  See 
id.  Although individual creditors did not have standing to raise an unfair discrimination 
objection, see In re Stanley Drug Co., 22 F. Supp. 664 (E.D. Pa. 1938), such objections were 
unnecessary.  The bankruptcy judge was required to assess independently whether the plan 
unfairly discriminated against a class, see 11 U.S.C. § 766(3) (1946) (requiring that a plan be 
“fair and equitable”), just as a bankruptcy judge today must independently determine that a plan 
is feasible under the Bankruptcy Code, see id. § 1129 (a)(11) (2012). 
 42. See 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(1) (indicating that a Chapter 13 debtor’s plan may 
discriminate in favor of a consumer claim for which the debtor has a co-debtor). 
 43. See id. §§ 901(a), 1129(b)(1), 1322(b)(1). 
7
Hynes and Walt: Fair and Unfair Discrimination in Municipal Bankruptcy
Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 2015
32 CAMPBELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 37:25 
interpretations of unfair discrimination in Chapters 9, 11, and 13, without 
regard to the bankruptcy chapter in which the standard appears.44 
Courts generally state a standard of unfairness based on a four-part 
“test.”  According to the test, discrimination is fair only if: (1) it has a 
reasonable basis; (2) it is necessary to carry out the plan; (3) it is proposed in 
good faith; and (4) it is related to the basis for the discrimination.45  This “test” 
is poorly designed.  The requirement that the discrimination be proposed in 
good faith is superfluous, given the separate requirement that the 
reorganization plan be proposed in good faith.46  In addition, only the second 
requirement is informative.47  If a plan cannot be implemented without 
disfavoring a class, the discrimination is necessary to implement the plan.  
This demanding requirement is unlikely to be met in most cases.48  Without an 
alternative plan that is otherwise preferable but does not disfavor the class, the 
discrimination against the class is fair.  The other factors are uninformative.  
Discrimination that has no reasonable basis is irrational, arbitrary, and 
therefore, unfair.  For its part, discrimination that is unrelated to the basis for 
discrimination is unfair.  As for the third requirement, a plan calling for 
discrimination that is proposed in bad faith, solely to harm the disfavored 
class, is also unfair. 
Cases involving different treatment of coequal classes are difficult and 
controversial in part because their resolution requires application of a standard 
of unfair discrimination.49  The trouble with the four-part test is that it does not 
 
 44. See, e.g., Ownby v. Jim Beck, Inc. (In re Jim Beck, Inc.), 214 B.R. 305, 307 (W.D. Va. 
1997) (citing and relying on In re Aztec Co., 107 B.R. 585, 589–90 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1989) 
(applying case law interpreting § 1322(b)(1) to be the same as § 1129(b)(1)’s interpretation), 
aff’d per curiam, 162 F.3d 1155 (4th Cir. 1998)); In re Simmons, 288 B.R. 737, 747 n.32 
(Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2003) (“There appears to be no reason to assume that Congress intended 
different meanings for the term ‘unfair discrimination’ in chapters 11 and 13 . . . .”). 
 45. See, e.g., Mickelson v. Leser (In re Leser), 939 F.2d 669, 672 (8th Cir. 1991); AMFAC 
Distrib. Corp. v. Wolff (In re Wolff), 22 B.R. 510, 512 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1982); In re Davis, 209 
B.R. 893, 895 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1997); Comm. on Bankr. & Corporate Reorganization, Ass’n of 
the Bar of N.Y.C., Making the Test for Unfair Discrimination More “Fair”: A Proposal, 58 
BUS. LAW. 83, 88, 90 (2002) (describing the four-part test as the one most widely used by 
courts). 
 46. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 901(a), 1129(a)(3), 1325(a)(3). 
 47. See In re Crawford, 324 F.3d 539, 542 (7th Cir. 2003). 
 48. See infra notes 64–119 and accompanying text. 
 49. For instances of controversy over the proper standard of unfair discrimination to apply, 
see, for example, In re Armstrong World Indus., Inc., 348 B.R. 111, 122 (D. Del. 2006) 
(applying the “rebuttable presumption” approach); In re Jim Beck, Inc., 214 B.R. at 307 
(affirming the bankruptcy court’s application of the “four-part test”); In re Greystone III Joint 
Venture, 102 B.R. 560, 571–72 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1989) (applying the mechanical approach), 
rev’d sub nom. Phoenix Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Greystone III Joint Venture (In re Greystone III 
Joint Venture), 995 F.2d 1274 (5th Cir. 1991). 
8
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tell a court which considerations make a difference in treatment that is 
reasonable, nor does it describe the permissible range of differences in 
treatment.  It merely tells the court what the court already knows: that a 
reasonable basis for a difference in treatment or a difference in treatment 
within a permissible range is fair.  Nearly all courts and commentators 
recognize a presumption of unfair discrimination if one class of claims or 
interests receives a much higher rate of recovery or is exposed to less risk than 
a coequal class of claims or interests.50  The difficulty is determining the point 
at which the disparity in distribution or risk triggers the presumption.  Without 
a standard of unfair discrimination, setting the presumption at one point rather 
than another is arbitrary. 
A. Equal Treatment and Unfair Discrimination 
The Bankruptcy Code and case law applying it suggests a standard of 
unfair discrimination.  Bankruptcy law begins with a principle of equal 
distribution among creditors: creditors share equally in proportion to their 
claims.51  Nonetheless, the Code explicitly recognizes departures from this 
principle of pro rata sharing by giving some claims priority over others.52  For 
example, certain tax claims are given priority over other unsecured claims. 53  
The Code also gives effect to priority established by contract between 
creditors.  Thus, if one creditor agrees to subordinate its interest to another, the 
Code honors the agreement.54  Finally, the Code recognizes property rights 
created outside of bankruptcy that give some creditors priority over others.  
For example, it generally gives effect to nonbankruptcy-law rules that give a 
secured creditor priority with respect to its collateral over a general creditor.55  
Subject to these important exceptions, the Code enforces a principle of equal 
treatment of claims.  This is the principle that courts routinely recite.56 
 
 50. See, e.g., In re Armstrong World Indus., 348 B.R. at 121–22; In re Aleris Int’l, Inc., No. 
09-10478, 2010 Bankr. LEXIS 2997, at *95 (Bankr. D. Del. May 3, 2010); 7 COLLIER ON 
BANKRUPTCY ¶ 1129.03[3][b], at 1129-67 to -68 (Alan N. Resnick & Henry J. Sommer eds., 
16th ed. 2014); Markell, supra note 16, at 228. 
 51. See supra note 11 and accompanying text. 
 52. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 507(a) (2012) (granting some claims priority over general 
unsecured creditors). 
 53. Id. § 507(a)(8). 
 54. Id. § 510(a). 
 55. See id. §§ 506(a), 725. 
 56. See Am. United Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. City of Avon Park, 311 U.S. 138, 147 (1940) 
(stating that the general rule of “equality between creditors” is applicable to all bankruptcy 
proceedings). 
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Bankruptcy’s standard of unfair discrimination includes the principle of 
equal treatment, but allows for unequal treatment if that treatment is fair.57  In 
this way, the Code’s unfair discrimination standard is a further exception to 
the bankruptcy principle of pro rata sharing—a principle of equality.  A class 
is discriminated against if what it is promised under the plan is different from 
what is promised to another class holding the same claims with the same 
priority.58  In a straightforward way, the plan treats the disfavored differently 
from the favored class—unequally.  However, the Code’s standard of unfair 
discrimination prohibits the different treatment only if the different treatment 
is unfair.59  Promising Class A 50% and Class B 75% payouts of their 
respective claims does not by itself unfairly discriminate against Class A.  
Because the Code permits discrimination if the difference in treatment is fair, 
the standard of unfair discrimination requires more than a violation of the 
principle of pro rata sharing. 
Although the Code does not say when discrimination is fair, case law and 
common sense do.  Case law recognizes circumstances in which there is good 
reason for the reorganization plan to treat two classes of claims differently.  In 
these circumstances, the different treatment is found to be “fair.”  Four 
circumstances can be identified in which a plan might propose to favor one 
class over another: (1) when the favored class has priority over the disfavored 
class;60 (2) when a class contributes value to the debtor;61 (3) when it is 
necessary for the plan to favor one class over another;62 and (4) when the plan 
favors one class over another for reasons other than contribution or 
necessity.63  Courts have deemed the different treatment fair in the first three 
types of circumstances.  Subsection B describes the four categories of 
circumstances, and Section II argues that neither the Code nor case law allows 
different treatment in the fourth circumstance. 
B. Fair Discrimination 
As stated above, a departure from the Code’s principle of equal treatment 
might be fair in four circumstances.  The Code or the predominant case law 
recognizes three of the four circumstances. The fourth scenario is 
controversial and finds no support in the Code or in relevant cases. 
 
 57. See Markell, supra note 16, at 228. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. 
 60. See infra notes 64–65 and accompanying text. 
 61. See infra notes 66–82 and accompanying text. 
 62. See infra notes 83–107 and accompanying text. 
 63. See infra notes 108–19 and accompanying text. 
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1.  Priority 
The Code recognizes the priority of certain claims over others.64  Because 
a claim with priority is paid before one without priority, the claims are treated 
differently.  It cannot be unfair discrimination, in the relevant sense of the 
phrase, for a plan to pay different amounts to priority claims than to other 
claims.  Otherwise, a plan could not respect both the Code’s priority scheme 
and the unfair discrimination standard, unless the debtor was solvent.  Courts 
agree, finding that the standard applies only when the plan proposes to pay 
different classes of claims having the same priority.65  Thus, a plan does not 
unfairly discriminate against junior claims when it proposes higher payouts for 
senior claims.  The category of priority is fairly obvious and uncontroversial. 
2.  Contribution 
Contribution is another circumstance in which different treatment of 
creditors is fair.66  If a plan promises to pay one creditor’s claim more than the 
claims of other creditors in exchange for that creditor’s contribution to the 
reorganization, the plan does not treat the disfavored creditors unfairly.  The 
contributing creditor’s favorable treatment is on account of its contribution, 
not on account of its prepetition claim.  Predominant case law considers the 
difference in contribution to justify a difference in treatment.67 
To better understand this argument, consider facts that are not ordinarily 
thought of as involving unfair discrimination.  Assume that a debtor’s plan 
promises to pay all unsecured creditors 50% of their claims.  One creditor is a 
supplier and continues to deliver widgets to the debtor during the 
reorganization process.  In exchange, the debtor promises to pay the supplier 
some additional amount for the new widgets, say $100.  The other creditors 
might argue that the supplier’s $100 claim should not be allowed as an 
administrative expense because it is not an actual and necessary cost of 
preserving the estate.68  Suppose, however, that the debtor pays the supplier 
before the plan is confirmed, under its authority to use assets in the ordinary 
course of business.69  Under existing law, a creditor in a class that rejects the 
plan can object and argue that the $100 payment constitutes unfair 
discrimination because the payment was really on account of the supplier’s 
 
 64. See supra notes 50, 52–56 and accompanying text. 
 65. See, e.g., In re Armstrong World Indus., Inc., 348 B.R. 111, 121–22 (D. Del. 2006); In 
re BWP Transp., Inc., 462 B.R. 225, 232 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2011); In re Simmons, 288 B.R. 
737, 748 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2003). 
 66. See, e.g., Markell, supra note 16, at 228. 
 67. See, e.g., Mason v. Paradise Irrigation Dist., 326 U.S. 536, 543 (1946). 
 68. See 11 U.S.C. § 503(b)(1)(A) (2012). 
 69. See id. § 363(c)(1). 
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prepetition claim.70  If a creditor makes this objection, the analysis will be 
very similar to that of the administrative expense objection.  The court will ask 
whether the $100 paid to the supplier is a reasonable estimate of the 
contribution made and thus, should not be presumed to be on account of the 
prebankruptcy claim. 
This precedent was established in American United Mutual Life 
Insurance Co. v. City of Avon Park,71 the first modern unfair discrimination 
case.  In Avon Park, in a Chapter IX arrangement under the Bankruptcy Act, 
the municipality contracted with an agent to help obtain the necessary 
acceptance by creditors.72  The agent was also the municipality’s creditor.73  
The agent received a fee collected from bondholders that was calculated 
differently depending on whether the bondholders sold their interest coupons 
to the party.74  Because the lower court found that this fee was reasonable in 
light of the services provided, it concluded that the compensation did not 
discriminate unfairly in favor of the agent.75  However, the agent also 
purchased bonds at a discount, and the lower court did not determine the 
reasonableness of the profit that the agent would earn on these bonds.76  The 
Court considered this reversible error.77 
Avon Park stands for the proposition that a court applying the unfair 
discrimination standard must consider all of the benefits received by the 
creditor on account of its claim in the reorganization, not just those designated 
as the repayment of its claim under the plan.78  Discrimination is fair only if it 
is reasonable, taking into account the contribution made and all of the benefits 
realized by the party.79 
The more frequent unfair discrimination cases do not involve cash 
payment for a creditor’s contribution.  Instead, they usually involve favorable 
treatment of the creditor’s prepetition claim in light of its contribution to the 
 
 70. See id. § 1129(b)(1) (requiring that a plan not discriminate unfairly against a class of 
impaired claims that has rejected the plan). 
 71. Am. United Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. City of Avon Park, 311 U.S. 138 (1940). 
 72. Id. at 141. 
 73. Id. at 142–43. 
 74. Id. at 141. 
 75. Id. at 143. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. at 148 (“In absence of a finding that the aggregate emoluments receivable by the 
[agent’s] interests were reasonable, measured by the services rendered, it cannot be said that the 
consideration accruing to them, under or as a consequence of the adoption of the plan, likewise 
accrued to all other creditors of the same class.”). 
 78. See id. at 144. 
 79. See id. 
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reorganization.80  In such a scenario, the debtor argues that the favorable 
treatment is not on account of the claim, but on account of the creditor’s 
contribution.81  The debtor pays for the contribution by increasing the payment 
of the creditor’s prepetition claim rather than in cash.  Nonetheless, the 
proposition stated in Avon Park still applies.  How the debtor structures the 
payment to a creditor for its prepetition claim and its new contribution is 
merely a formality.  Courts must examine the substance of the transaction to 
ensure that a creditor is not receiving more on account of its prepetition claim 
than other creditors receive on their claims with the same priority.82  The task 
is a little more difficult when the debtor formally structures the payment for 
the contribution as a repayment of the prepetition claim, but a court can still 
calculate the additional recovery awarded to the contributing creditor and ask 
whether this is a reasonable price for the creditor’s services. 
3.  Necessity 
Favorable treatment of a class might sometimes be needed to confirm a 
reorganization plan.83  Without favorable treatment, the only alternative could 
be to liquidate the debtor’s assets, either as part of a Chapter 7 case or a 
Chapter 11 liquidating reorganization. 
Some cases designated as necessity cases are better understood as 
contribution cases.  For example, assume that the debtor wants to offer a 
greater recovery rate to a favored supplier or its existing workers because it 
fears that they would refuse to deal with the debtor otherwise.  The debtor’s 
 
 80. See, e.g., Markell, supra note 16, at 241. 
 81. The contribution exception is similar to the new-value exception to the absolute-
priority rule.  In the new-value context, debtors argue that a holder of a junior claim or interest 
is not receiving value on account of their claim or interest but rather in exchange for some new 
value or contribution made.  Although the Supreme Court has not affirmed the new-value 
exception, it has said that the exception, if it exists, must be limited to ensure that the new value 
is at least as valuable as what the holder of the claim or interest receives.  See Bank of Am. 
Nat’l Trust & Sav. Ass’n v. 203 N. LaSalle St. P’ship, 526 U.S. 434, 458 (1999).  More 
specifically, the Supreme Court insists that the new value be “in money or in money’s worth” 
and that the exchange be subject to a “market test.”  See id. at 445, 458 (quoting Case v. L.A. 
Lumber Prods. Co., 308 U.S. 106, 122 (1939)).  Similarly, the contribution exception to the 
unfair discrimination standard requires that favorable treatment under the plan be on account of 
the contribution, not on account of a prepetition claim.  The required form of the contribution 
and the test for its presence are separate matters that this Article does not address. 
 82. Bankruptcy courts routinely look to the substance of the transaction and disregard its 
form.  See, e.g., In re LTV Steel Co., 274 B.R. 278, 286–87 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2001). 
 83. See, e.g., In re Perskin, 9 B.R. 626, 632 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1981) (stating that it was fair 
to discriminate in favor of credit-card debt when the debtor needed continued access to cards to 
continue his business as a traveling salesman); In re Ragsdale, 15 B.R. 668, 670–71 (Bankr. 
N.D. Ga. 1980) (ordering fair discrimination in favor of the creditor, partly secured by a car 
needed for the debtor’s business). 
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argument is best understood as favored treatment based on contribution: the 
proposal is to pay for the supplier or workers’ contributions in supplies or 
labor by favoring their prepetition claims.  Following Avon Park, courts 
should ask whether the value of the contributed supplies or services is 
commensurate with what the debtor gives to the favored creditor under the 
plan plus any other consideration paid.84  If not, their enhanced recovery will 
reduce the total creditor recovery and must come at the expense of the 
disfavored creditors.  In these circumstances, courts should reject the plan as 
unfairly discriminatory. 
Other cases are genuine instances of necessity.  For example, full 
payment of wage claims might be the price of a labor union’s continued 
cooperation, which the debtor needs to stay in business.85  If these claims are 
not paid, the union may induce potential buyers not to purchase the debtor’s 
products.  Here, the labor union is not contributing something to the debtor.  
Payment of wage claims is merely the price of the union not carrying out its 
threat.86  If the alternative is liquidation, the test is one of profitability.  
Favorable treatment is fair when it is necessary for the profitability of the 
reorganized debtor.87  The proposed wage payment therefore does not unfairly 
discriminate against the debtor’s disfavored creditors. 
The profitability test of necessity requires a showing that without the 
favorable treatment, the reorganized debtor would operate at a loss and be 
forced to liquidate.  The debtor must establish that suppliers or employees 
would fail to continue providing goods or services, even at a competitive rate 
of return, unless the reorganization plan treated their prepetition claims 
favorably.88  The showing is likely to be credible in very few plans.  More 
important, the profitability test of necessity has no application to municipal 
bankruptcies under Chapter 9.  This is because the purpose of a municipality’s 
Chapter 9 bankruptcy is only to relieve the municipality of its burdensome 
debt obligations, not to efficiently redeploy its assets.89  Relieving the 
 
 84. See supra notes 78–82 and accompanying text. 
 85. See In re Kliegl Bros. Universal Elec. Stage Lighting Co., 149 B.R. 306, 309 (Bankr. 
E.D.N.Y. 1992) (stating that a 75% distribution on union members’ wage claims did not 
unfairly discriminate in the face of a threat of strike when a union shop was needed to remain in 
the industry). 
 86. A few courts have sanctioned lesser threats as willful violations of the automatic stay.  
See, e.g., Sportfame of Ohio, Inc. v. Wilson Sporting Goods Co. (In re Sportfame of Ohio, 
Inc.), 40 B.R. 47, 53 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1984) (holding that a threat to refuse future goods and 
services unless prior debt was paid violated the automatic stay); accord Olson v. McFarland 
Clinic, P.C. (In re Olson), 38 B.R. 515, 519 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1984). 
 87. Markell, supra note 16, at 261. 
 88. See supra notes 85–86 and accompanying text. 
 89. See Michael W. McConnell & Randal C. Picker, When Cities Go Broke: A Conceptual 
Introduction to Municipal Bankruptcy, 60 U. CHI. L. REV. 425, 469–70 (1993).  Chapter 9 limits 
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municipality from its debts only requires the municipality to generate 
sufficient revenues to pay creditors the amounts promised under the plan, 
consistent with maintaining basic municipal services.90  It does not require the 
municipality to generate revenues in excess of operating costs.  The 
profitability test can be modified in the case of municipalities to allow 
favorable treatment of a class only if, without the treatment, the municipality 
could not carry out its plan.  Even as modified, however, the test remains 
strict.  It requires establishing that employees or suppliers of goods or 
financing will refuse to continue providing their inputs, even at a competitive 
rate of return, unless their prepetition claims are favored.  This showing is 
unlikely to be made successfully in most circumstances. 
The necessity justification has a lot in common with the doctrine of 
necessity or critical vendor payments.  Judge Easterbrook’s opinion in In re 
Kmart Corp.91 is instructive.  Critical vendor payments are full repayments of 
favored creditors at the outset of bankruptcy.92  They amount to fair 
discrimination in favor of the critical vendor prior to the confirmation of the 
plan.93  In Kmart, Judge Easterbrook accepted the possibility that the Code 
could authorize critical vendor payments.94  Nonetheless, he denied the 
debtor’s authority to make them because he found that the debtor failed to 
demonstrate that the critical vendors would otherwise refuse to supply it, or 
that the disfavored creditors would be made better off.95  Judge Easterbrook 
further argued that it will be hard for the debtor to make such a showing, in 
part because the debtor offers a credit enhancement to assure suppliers of 
 
the authority of a court to order the municipality to dispose assets or increase fees or taxes.  See 
11 U.S.C. § 904(2) (2012) (stating that unless the municipality or plan provides otherwise, the 
court may not interfere with municipal assets or revenue); In re N.Y.C. Off-Track Betting 
Corp., 434 B.R. 131, 140 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2010) (citing 11 U.S.C. § 904 and U.S. CONST. 
amend. X to support the proposition that bankruptcy courts are unable to dispose of municipal 
assets without the debtor’s consent). 
 90. See 11 U.S.C. § 928(b) (stating that liens on special revenues shall be subject to the 
municipality’s necessary operating expenses). 
 91. In re Kmart Corp., 359 F.3d 866 (7th Cir. 2004).  In fact, Judge Easterbrook explicitly 
relied on an unfair discrimination case from Chapter 13.  See id. at 874 (citing In re Crawford, 
324 F.3d 539 (7th Cir. 2003)). 
 92. Id. at 868. 
 93. Id. at 874 (noting that critical vendor payments discriminate among creditors and are 
considered fair upon a showing that the preference has a prospect of benefit for the other 
creditors). 
 94. Id. at 872. 
 95. Id. at 873–74. 
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payment.96  Despite Judge Easterbrook’s skepticism, critical vendor payments 
remain fairly routine.97 
Courts that allow “necessity” to justify discriminatory treatment in a 
reorganization plan should require debtors to demonstrate true necessity.98  
They often do not.99  The debtor should be required to demonstrate that it 
could not use alternative means to secure future goods or services such as 
letters of credit or the full funding of its pensions.  Too often, however, courts 
approve discrimination on a mere assertion of need.100 
One circumstance that can occur in a Chapter 11 reorganization might fit 
under the necessity category.  Assume that a debtor files for bankruptcy in 
Chapter 11.  The debtor has a creditor with an undersecured nonrecourse 
claim and a number of trade creditors with unsecured claims against it.  Unless 
the undersecured creditor elects to have its entire claim treated as secured, 
§ 1111(b) deems the undersecured nonrecourse claim to have recourse against 
the debtor in Chapter 11.101  Suppose that the creditor does not elect to have its 
entire claim treated as secured.  In this case, the creditor is deemed to hold two 
claims: an unsecured claim in the amount of the deficiency, and a secured 
claim in the amount of the value of the collateral.102  Suppose, too, that the 
 
 96. Id. at 873. 
 97. See, e.g., In re Jeans.com, 502 B.R. 250, 259 (Bankr. D.P.R. 2013); In re Tropical 
Sportswear Int’l Corp., 320 B.R. 15, 17 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2005).  For the frequent issuance of 
critical vendor orders before Kmart, see LYNN M. LOPUCKI, COURTING FAILURE 163–67 (2005); 
but see Timothy M. Lupinacci & Daniel J. Ferretti, Recent Trends in Critical Vendor 
Jurisprudence Post-Kmart, NORTON BANKR. L. ADVISER, Apr. 2009, at 1 (arguing that since 
Kmart, courts have been more reluctant to allow critical vendor payments). 
 98. In Kmart, Judge Easterbrook also stated that the debtor must show that the other 
creditors would receive more than they would receive in a liquidation.  Kmart, 359 F.3d at 872–
73.  This test should be stricter.  The “best interests of creditors” test ensures that a creditor 
receives at least this amount; unfair discrimination would be superfluous if it did not require 
more. 
 99. See, e.g., In re Kliegl Bros. Universal Elec. Stage Lighting Co., 149 B.R. 306, 309 
(Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1992) (finding that discrimination was fair where it was based on an 
unsupported allegation of need to avoid a strike); In re Furlow, 70 B.R. 973, 977 (Bankr. E.D. 
Pa. 1987) (holding that a debtor is not required to establish that a plan cannot be confirmed 
without favorable treatment of a claim—proof of a rational basis for the treatment is sufficient); 
In re Perskin, 9 B.R. 626, 632 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1981) (finding discrimination to be reasonable 
absent a showing that a plan favoring credit-card debt was the only possible plan). 
 100. See In re Kliegl Bros., 149 B.R. at 309.  But cf. In re Graphic Commc’ns, Inc., 200 B.R. 
143, 149 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1996) (“[T]he debtor has not demonstrated that its treatment of 
Midwest’s claim is necessary to successfully reorganize, or that it could not carry out a plan of 
reorganization that did not discriminate between Class III and Class IV.”); In re ARN LTD. 
Ltd. P’ship, 140 B.R. 5, 12 (Bankr. D.D.C. 1992) (refusing to justify discrimination based on 
“speculation” that discrimination was necessary). 
 101. 11 U.S.C. § 1111(b) (2012). 
 102. Id. § 506(a)(1). 
16
Campbell Law Review, Vol. 37, Iss. 1 [2015], Art. 3
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol37/iss1/3
2015] FAIR AND UNFAIR DISCRIMINATION 41 
debtor’s reorganization plan puts the deficiency claim and the claims of the 
trade creditors in different classes and proposes to pay the trade creditors in 
full and the deficiency claim nothing.103  Finally, assume that the going-
concern value is insufficient to pay both the deficiency claims and the trade 
creditors in full, but that the liquidation value of the debtor’s assets that do not 
serve as collateral for the undersecured claim is sufficient to pay the trade 
creditors in full.  The creditor votes its deficiency claim to reject the plan. 
On these assumptions, the plan arguably does not unfairly discriminate 
against the deficiency claim.  This is because Chapter 11 requires a claim 
holder to receive under the plan at least as much as it would receive in a 
Chapter 7 liquidation, unless it has accepted the plan.104  In a Chapter 7 
liquidation, the nonrecourse creditor has no deficiency claim and therefore 
receives no distribution on account of it.105  By contrast, under the ongoing 
assumptions, in a Chapter 7 liquidation, the debtor has sufficient assets to pay 
the trade creditors in full.  As a result, the trade creditors can block any 
Chapter 11 plan that does not propose full payment.  Because the debtor’s 
going-concern value does not allow for the full payment of both the trade 
creditors and the deficiency claim, only a plan that discriminated between the 
claims can be approved.106  Thus, the plan’s discrimination in favor of the 
trade creditors is necessary.  Although the circumstance described can arise in 
a Chapter 11 reorganization, it cannot arise in a Chapter 9 municipal 
bankruptcy.  This is because unlike Chapter 11, Chapter 9 does not give a 
nonrecourse claim a deficiency.107 
4.  “Other” 
Falling under the “other” category are circumstances in which favorable 
treatment of a class is fair without priority, contribution, or necessity making it 
so.  This residual category includes favorable treatment based on 
administrative convenience.108  Occasionally, providing for an equal 
proportionate distribution among coequal classes might not be cost-
 
 103. This hypothetical is closely based on the facts of Bank of America National Trust 
Savings Ass’n v. 203 North LaSalle Street Partnership, 526 U.S. 434 (1999). 
 104. See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(7)(A)(ii). 
 105. See id. § 103(g) (limiting § 1111(b) to bankruptcies filed under Chapter 11). 
 106. The Seventh Circuit accepted this argument in Bank of America National Trust Savings 
Ass’n v. 203 North LaSalle Street Partnership, 126 F.3d 955, 969 (7th Cir. 1997), rev’d on 
other grounds, 526 U.S. 434 (1999). 
 107. Cf. 11 U.S.C. § 901(a), which does not incorporate § 1111(b). 
 108. See, e.g., In re Cello Energy, LLC, Nos. 10-04877-MAM-11, 10-04931-MAM-11, 10-
04930-MAM-11, 2012 Bankr. LEXIS 1533, at *46–47 (Bankr. S.D. Ala. Apr. 10, 2012); In re 
Storberg, 94 B.R. 144, 146 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1988). 
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justified.109  Valuing different sorts of consideration to be given to different 
classes to assure that they have exactly the same present value can be costly.  
The differences can be slight enough not to justify the effort needed to assure 
an exactly equal proportionate distribution.  Alternatively, significant 
bookkeeping costs can be incurred in paying the members of a large class of 
creditors over time to assure that they receive exactly the same present value 
as other coequal classes.110  In these circumstances, administrative 
convenience allows differences in treatment to be fair. 
The cases do not usually address administrative convenience.111  
However, they rely on the standard of unfair discrimination to justify different 
treatment.  Some courts require demonstration of a “reasonable basis” for 
favorable treatment.112  This requires the plan proponent to establish the basis 
for the treatment.  A showing that even the disfavored class benefits from 
avoiding a costly valuation exercise establishes a reasonable basis for a small 
difference in the percentage of payments between coequal classes.113  A line of 
cases invokes the rebuttable presumption that a plan that provides for a 
materially greater percentage recovery to a coequal class unfairly 
discriminates against the disfavored class.114  Small differences in payments 
promised to coequal classes do not trigger the presumption, because they are 
not material.115  The absence of the presumption aids the plan proponent, by 
easing the burden of proving that administrative convenience makes the 
 
 109. See, e.g., In re Cello, 2012 Bankr. LEXIS 1533, at *46–47 (holding that an immediate 
cash payment to the class was not unfair discrimination for administrative reasons because it 
reduced bookkeeping costs). 
 110. See id. 
 111. For exceptions, see, for example, id.; In re Storberg, 94 B.R. at 146. 
 112. See Markell, supra note 16, at 242–43 (citing In re Aztec Co., 107 B.R. 585, 590 
(Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1989)); see also supra note 45 and accompanying text. 
 113. Cf. Union Sav. Bank v. Augie/Restivo Baking Co. (In re Augie/Restivo Baking Co.), 
860 F.2d 515, 518–19 (2d Cir. 1988) (citing Chem. Bank N.Y. Trust Co. v. Kheel, 369 F.2d 
845, 847 (2d Cir. 1966)); In re Commercial Envelope Mfg. Co., Nos. 76 B 2354, 76 B 2355, 76 
B 2356, 76 B 2357, 1977 Bankr. LEXIS 15, at *10 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Aug. 22, 1977) 
(discussing substantive consolidation where the affairs of different entities are so entangled that 
all creditors benefit from consolidation, but ultimately holding that such a level of entanglement 
was not present under the facts). 
 114. See, e.g., In re Armstrong World Indus., Inc., 348 B.R. 111, 121–22 (D. Del. 2006); In 
re Prosperity Park, LLC, No. 10-31399, 2011 Bankr. LEXIS 1852, at *10 (Bankr. W.D.N.C. 
May 17, 2011) (citing In re Dow Corning Corp., 244 B.R. 705, 710–11 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 
1999)); In re Genesis Health Ventures, Inc., 266 B.R. 591, 611–12 (Bankr. D. Del. 2001). 
 115. See In re Armstrong World Indus., 348 B.R. at 121–22; In re Prosperity Park, 2011 
Bankr. LEXIS 1852, at *10 (citing In re Dow Corning Corp., 244 B.R. at 710–11); In re 
Genesis Health Ventures, 266 B.R. at 611–12. 
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favorable treatment reasonable, because it benefits even the disfavored 
class.116 
Another circumstance unrelated to priority, contribution, or necessity that 
in principle could justify favorable treatment is the favored creditor’s status.  
Moral notions of fairness, including a creditor’s vulnerability or need, might 
argue for favoring the creditor’s claims over coequal claims.  Nonetheless, 
case law rejects this basis for discriminating against creditors.  The majority of 
cases find that a creditor’s status as unsecured tort creditor or holder of a 
nondischargeable student debt is an insufficient ground for giving the 
creditor’s claim preferential treatment.117  Similarly, the terms of a debt, such 
as its length, alone do not justify different treatment from claims with the 
same priority.118  Courts reason that the character of the creditor or nature of 
its claim is not a permissible basis for favorable treatment unless the Code 
gives the creditor’s claim priority.  Even the courts that allow favorable 
treatment of nondischargeable student debt do so based on a statutory 
argument for the treatment.119  A reasonable inference from the case law on 
the subject is that moral notions of fairness that find no support in the Code do 
not inform the unfair discrimination standard. 
II. UNFAIR DISCRIMINATION: MUNICIPAL WORKERS AND RETIREES 
Part I identified four categories of discrimination that might be fair: (1) 
favorable treatment in recognition of a legal priority enjoyed by the favored 
creditor; (2) favorable treatment in recognition of a contribution made by the 
favored creditor; (3) favorable treatment necessary for a successful 
reorganization; and (4) favorable treatment supported by “other” 
considerations.  This Part evaluates whether the justifications organized by 
these categories allow a municipality’s reorganization plan to favor the 
 
 116. See In re Mount Carbon Metro. Dist., 242 B.R. 18, 31 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1999) (holding 
that the municipality bears the burden of proving that its plan satisfies the confirmation 
requirements of § 943). 
 117. See, e.g., Gorman v. Birts (In re Birts), No. 1:12cv427 (LMB/TCB), 2012 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 107811, at *9–10 (E.D. Va. Aug. 1, 2012); In re Thibodeau, 248 B.R. 699, 702–03 
(Bankr. D. Mass. 2000); In re Chapman, 146 B.R. 411, 417–18 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1992) 
(analyzing the holders of nondischargeable student debt). 
 118. See, e.g., In re Zeigafuse, No. 11-20854, 2012 Bankr. LEXIS 1463, at *13 (Bankr. 
Wyo. Apr. 5, 2012) (holding that the contested plan unfairly discriminated in favor of a student-
loan creditor); In re Simmons, 288 B.R. 737, 749 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2003) (analyzing the terms 
of a loan that exceeded the Chapter 13 plan period). 
 119. See, e.g., In re Truss, 404 B.R. 329, 334 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 2009); In re Cox, 186 B.R. 
744, 746–47 (Bankr. N.D. Fla. 1995) (allowing favorable treatment of student debt under a plan 
supported by inference from 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(5) (2012) (quoting In re Eiland, 170 B.R. 370, 
379 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1994))). 
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prepetition claims of the municipality’s workers and retirees.  Although the 
priority and contribution categories find firm support in the Bankruptcy Code 
and existing case law, this Article argues that they cannot justify a 
municipality’s decision to provide a greater recovery for retirement claims of 
active and former workers.  The necessity category provides a bit stronger 
justification for the preference, but it is unlikely that municipalities could offer 
sufficient proof to justify discriminatory treatment.  On the other hand, they 
may not have to.  A court faced with strong political pressure to approve a 
plan may seize on the necessity argument to justify a departure from the norm 
of equal treatment.  In the final, “other” category, is the argument that 
considerations of fairness unrelated to those organized under the other 
categories allow active and former workers better treatment under the plan.  
The little case law that exists on this matter clearly rejects creditor need as a 
basis for better treatment, and this Article agrees.  Moreover, case law aside, 
the fairness case for preferring retirees and active workers to other municipal 
creditors is not compelling. 
A. Priority 
Part I noted that bankruptcy law frequently departs from the norm of 
equal treatment by granting some claims priority over others.120  The pension 
claims of retirees and active workers do not enjoy a general priority over other 
unsecured claims.121  Even the modest wage priority applicable in other 
bankruptcy chapters does not apply in Chapter 9.122 If applicable 
nonbankruptcy law or the funding practices of municipalities were different, 
retirees and active workers could have priority over general unsecured claims.  
State statutory liens or trusts could give workers’ claims priority with respect 
to a municipality’s tax revenue, and these liens are respected in bankruptcy.123  
The Bankruptcy Code in this case would recognize the priority even with 
respect to postpetition taxes.124  Federal and state legislation create statutory 
trusts in favor of certain beneficiaries,125 and federal or state law could create 
 
 120. See supra notes 51–55 and accompanying text. 
 121. See Hynes & Walt, supra note 2, at 617–38. 
 122. See 11 U.S.C. § 901(a) (omitting § 507(a)(4)’s provision on wage priority from 
incorporation into Chapter 9). 
 123. See Hynes & Walt, supra note 2, at 649–59. 
 124. Although § 552 renders a security interest in assets acquired postpetition inoperable 
unless they are proceeds of existing collateral, the section does not apply to statutory liens.  See 
11 U.S.C. § 552(a). 
 125. See, e.g., Packers and Stockyards Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 196, 197 (2012) (requiring packers 
and live poultry dealers to maintain a statutory trust for the benefit of unpaid sellers or poultry 
growers); Perishable Agricultural Commodities Act, 7 U.S.C. § 499e(c)(2) (establishing a 
statutory trust for the benefit of all unpaid suppliers or sellers of perishable agricultural 
20
Campbell Law Review, Vol. 37, Iss. 1 [2015], Art. 3
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol37/iss1/3
2015] FAIR AND UNFAIR DISCRIMINATION 45 
statutory trusts or liens in favor of state employees.  Neither has done so.  
Alternatively, the municipality could have fully funded the workers’ benefits 
and either granted the workers a security interest in the funds or placed the 
funds in a separate legal entity against which only the workers have a claim.126  
The workers may be able to use this theory to claim priority with respect to 
the funds that have been set aside.127  However, bankrupt municipalities have 
drastically underfunded their retirement obligations.128  Other claims of 
worker priority are equally unavailing.  Although supporters of higher 
recovery rates for retirees and active workers sometimes cite state 
constitutional provisions that limit the impairment of pension rights, the 
provisions merely confer on pensions contract rights with the same priority as 
under other contracts, including municipal bonds.129 
In Detroit’s bankruptcy, Judge Rhodes cited Michigan’s constitutional 
protection of pensions to justify the plan’s preferential treatment of Detroit’s 
workers and retirees.130  First, although he restated his view that the state 
constitutional provision has no effect in bankruptcy, he considered it an 
expression of the “considered judgment of the people of the State of 
Michigan. . . . that is entitled to substantial consideration and deference.”131  
Second, Judge Rhodes believed that this constitutional provision gives 
Detroit’s workers and retirees a reasonable expectation of preferential 
treatment in bankruptcy and that this expectation should be honored.132  Both 
arguments are inconsistent with his earlier finding that the protections 
afforded to pensions under Michigan’s constitution merely afforded them the 
same protection afforded to all other contracts and did not give pensions any 
“extraordinary protection.”133  If, under the Michigan Constitution, pension 
 
commodities or products); MINN. STAT. § 27.138 (2012) (Wholesale Produce Dealers’ Trust) 
(holding the produce and products of produce of a wholesale produce dealer and proceeds in 
trust for the benefit of unpaid sellers). 
 126. For evidence that municipalities have not fully funded their pensions, see Novy-Marx 
& Rauh, supra note 1, at 1213–14, 1239. 
 127. See, e.g., David A. Skeel, Jr., Can Pensions Be Restructured in (Detroit’s) Municipal 
Bankruptcy? 10 n.27 (Federalist Soc’y, White Paper Series No. 508, 2013), available at http:// 
scholarship.law.upenn.edu/faculty_scholarship/508/ (conceding that strictly speaking, the 
pensioners do not hold secured claims against the municipality, but concluding that it is “almost 
certain[]” that a bankruptcy court would consider the pensioners’ claims to be secured). 
 128. See Novy-Marx & Rauh, supra note 1, at 1213–14, 1239. 
 129. See Hynes & Walt, supra note 2, at 641–43 (citing, inter alia, In re City of Detroit, 504 
B.R. 97, 127 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2013)). 
 130. See Detroit Supplemental Opinion, supra note 5, at 10, 176–77. 
 131. Id. at 177. 
 132. Id. 
 133. In re City of Detroit, 504 B.R. 97, 150–54 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2013). 
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rights are contractual rights,134 then Michigan’s constitution does not express a 
preference for paying pensions before other obligations, and any expectation 
of priority would be unreasonable.  Moreover, as we argue below, it is highly 
unlikely that Congress intended to authorize a judge (or state legislature) to 
make categorical judgments about the relative priority of creditors such as 
workers and general creditors.135 
B. Contribution 
Courts sometimes allow the plan to provide a greater recovery for some 
claims because the holder of these claims contributes something to the 
reorganization.136  The logic is that the additional recovery is not really on 
account of the claim but rather serves as consideration for the contribution.137  
In these cases, the plan does not discriminate in favor of the claim; it 
discriminates in favor of the contribution, which is unobjectionable.  It is easy 
to see how one could use this argument to justify a greater recovery for at least 
some active municipal workers.  These workers will contribute their labor to 
the municipality after the bankruptcy filing.  The city can pay the workers 
with wages, new pensions, and other postbankruptcy employee benefits.  
However, the other claimants should not object if the municipality structures 
the workers’ compensation so that some of it is received as a repayment of 
prebankruptcy claims.  At least, they should not object as long as the total 
value of the compensation is commensurate to the workers’ contribution or the 
market cost of acquiring replacement labor. 
The problem with the contribution justification is that the greater 
recovery received by many active and former workers will vastly exceed the 
contribution they make to the municipality’s recovery.  This is certainly true 
of the retirees, as they contribute nothing to the city’s reorganization; they 
have retired.  Many active workers will also retire very soon, making it 
implausible that the greater recovery they receive is reasonable when 
“measured by the services rendered.”138  In short, the contribution argument 
could, in theory, justify a narrowly tailored program that favored specific 
workers likely to stay with the municipality for a considerable period of time 
and work for below market wages and benefits.  It cannot justify the favorable 
treatment actually proposed by bankrupt municipalities. 
 
 134. Id. at 150. 
 135. See infra notes 189–202 and accompanying text. 
 136. See supra notes 66–82 and accompanying text. 
 137. See Am. United Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. City of Avon Park, 311 U.S. 138, 148 (1940). 
 138. Id. at 148. 
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C. Necessity 
Although municipal debtors cannot justify a greater recovery for retirees 
with a contribution argument, they may be able to make a necessity argument.  
They would argue that the municipality needs the goodwill and cooperation of 
its active and future workers, and the municipality must purchase this 
goodwill by repaying the retirees.  In other words, they would argue that 
active and future workers would be reluctant or unwilling to work for a 
municipality that breaks promises to its workers. 
While this necessity argument is theoretically plausible, it is unlikely that 
a bankrupt municipality could actually demonstrate the requisite necessity.  
Courts should require substantial proof of the relevant reluctance before 
crediting a necessity argument.  Otherwise, the argument is too malleable.  
Just as a municipality can advance a vague claim of necessity for paying its 
workers more than other creditors, it could advance similar vague claims of 
necessity for paying any of its other creditors more than the workers.  For 
example, a city may argue that it is necessary to pay its bonds in full so that it 
can access capital markets in the future.  The argument is initially implausible, 
because municipalities in bankruptcy have been able to obtain exit financing 
without proposing to pay defaulted debt in full.139  Cases in which courts 
credit an allegation of necessity based on a bare assertion make bad law.140 
As noted above, at least the Seventh Circuit insists that “the record 
show[] that the classification [and discrimination] would produce some benefit 
for the disfavored creditors.”141  In cases that allow discrimination on the 
grounds of necessity, courts require that no plan of reorganization could have 
been confirmed without the discrimination.142  If the plan is proposed in a 
Chapter 11 or 13 case, the disfavored creditors therefore benefit only if they 
get more than what they would have received were the estate liquidated in 
 
 139. See Matt Helms & Brent Snavely, Detroit Secures $275 Million in Bankruptcy Exit 
Financing, DETROIT FREE PRESS (Aug. 28, 2014, 7:28 PM), http://www.freep.com/story/news/ 
local/michigan/detroit/2014/08/28/detroit-secures-275-million-in-bankruptcy-exit-financing-/14 
754321/; Shelly Sigo, Jefferson County Details $1.7B Bankruptcy Exit Deal, BOND BUYER 
(Nov. 1, 2013, 2:27 PM), http://www.bondbuyer.com/issues/122_212/jefferson-county-details-
17b-bankruptcy-exit-deal-1056996-1.html. 
 140. See In re Kmart Corp., 359 F.3d 866, 868–69 (7th Cir. 2004) (describing the lower 
court’s critical vendor order issued in response to allegations of necessity). 
 141. Id. at 874 (citing In re Crawford, 324 F.3d 539 (7th Cir. 2003)). 
 142. See In re Hyatt, 509 B.R. 707, 716 (Bankr. D.N.M. 2014) (quoting In re Greate Bay 
Hotel & Casino, Inc., 251 B.R. 213, 228 (Bankr. D.N.J. 2000)); Creekstone Apartments 
Assocs., L.P. v. Resolution Trust Corp. (In re Creekstone Apartments Assocs., L.P.), 168 B.R. 
639, 645 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1994) (citing and relying on In re Creekside Landing, Ltd., 140 
B.R. 713 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1992), and In re Aztec Co., 107 B.R. 585 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 
1989)); In re Richard Buick, Inc., 126 B.R. 840, 852 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1991). 
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Chapter 7.  The “best interests of the creditors” test that applies in Chapters 11 
and 13 already guarantees disfavored creditors this amount.143  This is because 
the test sets a liquidation floor.  Thus, there is no need to test unfair 
discrimination in Chapters 11 or 13 by what the disfavored creditors would 
receive in a Chapter 7 liquidation.144 
The analysis in Chapter 9 is more complicated.  Although a Chapter 9 
debt adjustment plan cannot be confirmed unless it is in the best interest of the 
creditors,145 Congress did not specify the standard of best interests in that 
chapter.  A liquidation floor is inapplicable in Chapter 9, since municipalities 
are ineligible for Chapter 7 relief and cannot be liquidated.146  “Best interests 
of the creditors” in Chapter 9 could be interpreted to mean that an individual 
creditor can demand at least as much as it would have received if the case had 
been dismissed and it had enforced its claim against the municipality.147  But 
courts interpret the phrase to state a collective test. 148  Under this test, a plan is 
in the best interests of the creditors if it gives the group at least the amount 
that they would receive were the municipality to undertake to make reasonable 
efforts to repay them.149  If “best interests of the creditors” states the collective 
 
 143. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1129(a)(7), 1325(a)(4) (2012). 
 144. In theory, one could extend the necessity argument to a case in which the debtor could 
approve a plan of reorganization that did not discriminate among creditors, but that 
discrimination allows for an alternative plan with a much greater total distribution.  For 
example, assume that a firm must provide a creditor with favorable treatment if it is to continue 
its most important product line.  This discrimination may not be necessary for a reorganization; 
the firm could continue with its remaining product lines, but the reorganized firm may be much 
more profitable if it can discriminate.  If a court were to extend the necessity justification to 
such a case, it is not enough to ensure that the disfavored creditors receive at least as much as 
they would have received in a liquidation.  They should receive at least as much as they would 
have received in the alternative plan of reorganization.  One could extend the same argument to 
Chapter 9; if courts use necessity to justify discrimination that is not actually necessary to 
approve any plan of reorganization, they should ensure that the disfavored creditors receive at 
least as much as they would in an alternative feasible plan that did not discriminate. 
 145. See 11 U.S.C. § 943(b)(7). 
 146. See id. § 101(41) (excluding governmental units from the definition of person); id. 
§ 109(a) (limiting Chapter 7 to “persons”). 
 147. See 6 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 50, ¶ 943.03[7][a], at 943-25 to -27 (stating 
that the concept should mean that creditors receive more under the plan than under the 
alternative they have, where the alternative is dismissal of the case); cf. Faitoute Iron & Steel 
Co. v. City of Asbury Park, 316 U.S. 502, 515–16 (1942); Ashton v. Cameron Cnty. Water 
Improvement Dist. No. 1, 298 U.S. 513, 534 (1936) (Cardozo, J., dissenting) (describing debt 
collection from a municipality outside of bankruptcy). 
 148. See, e.g., Detroit Supplemental Opinion, supra note 5, at 103 (“Under this language, 
the question is whether the plan is in the best interests of creditors as a whole.”). 
 149. See In re Pierce Cnty. Hous. Auth., 414 B.R. 702, 718 (Bankr. W.D. Wash. 2009); In re 
Mount Carbon Metro. Dist., 242 B.R. 18, 34 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1999); 6 COLLIER ON 
BANKRUPTCY, supra note 50, ¶ 943.03[7][a], at 943-25 to -27; cf. In re Connector 2000 Ass’n, 
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test, courts applying the unfair discrimination standard in Chapter 9 need to 
ask whether the disfavored creditors as a group received more than they would 
receive compared to a specified floor.  A plausible floor is dismissal: 
discrimination is fair only if the plan gives each disfavored creditor at least as 
much as it would receive had the Chapter 9 case been dismissed and it had 
enforced its claim against the municipality.150 
Given that some of the disfavored claims in large municipal bankruptcies 
are to receive a return that is effectively zero,151 it is hard to imagine that the 
discrimination helps them.  In addition, the debtor should have to show that 
the discrimination is actually necessary to secure the goodwill and effort of 
future workers, and that those workers who refused to work for a municipality 
that failed to pay its retirees could not be replaced.  A municipality is unlikely 
to be able to make these showings.  Active and future workers may be 
reluctant to work for a municipality that failed to honor its commitment to pay 
retirees the amounts promised to them just as suppliers may be reluctant to 
deliver goods to a company that failed to pay its trade creditors in bankruptcy.  
However, a municipality could allay the fears of the active and future workers 
that their pensions will also be at risk either by fully funding their pensions or 
contracting with a third-party insurance company so that the pensions are not 
obligations of the city at all.152  These strategies are likely to be costly, but, 
given the amount owed to existing retirees, it is highly unlikely that they 
would be more costly than promising to pay retirement benefits in full.153 
D. Other Considerations 
Most commentators who contend that retirees and active workers should 
recover more than other claimants argue that given their diminished financial 
circumstances, the workers deserve the greater recovery in light of their past 
 
447 B.R. 752, 766 (Bankr. D.S.C. 2011) (holding that a plan is in the best interests of creditors 
when, inter alia, it gives them the greatest economic return from the debtor’s assets). 
 150. The same policy justifications that lead some courts to understand the “best interests of 
creditors” standard as stating a collective test are likely to cause them to resist a dismissal 
baseline for the unfair discrimination test. 
 151. See, e.g., Franklin Summary Objection, supra note 26, at 15 (referring to the city’s “de 
minimis payment” as “not reasonable”). 
 152. Private firms are increasingly transferring their pension obligations to third-party 
insurance companies.  See, e.g., Tony Avella, Workers’ Pensions Are At Risk, TIMESUNION.COM 
(Oct. 10, 2014, 10:05 AM), http://www.timesunion.com/opinion/article/Workers-pensions-are-
at-risk-4885142.php.  Senator Orrin Hatch has introduced legislation that would allow state and 
local governments to do so as well.  See Secure Annuities for Employee (SAFE) Retirement Act 
of 2013, S. 1270, 113th Cong., available at http://www.hatch.senate.gov/public/_cache/files/ 
730c41a0-4bc6-48ba-aabf-2075b08a853c/SAFE%20Retirement%20Act%20Summary.pdf. 
 153. For estimates of the size of state and municipal pensions, see Novy-Marx & Rauh, 
supra note 1, at 1239. 
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service or need.154  Desert or need is a matter of fairness broadly understood, 
and fairness might allow a plan to favor the claims of retirees and active 
workers over those of other coequal unsecured claimants.  For fairness to 
justify giving favorable treatment to retirees and active workers, two things 
must be true.  First, retirees and active workers must deserve or need a greater 
recovery than other claimants.  Second, the Bankruptcy Code must allow the 
favorable treatment of a class based on the desert or need of class members, or 
on another moral basis.  Both parts of the justification are unpersuasive.  The 
moral case for favorable treatment based on desert or need is not compelling.  
Even if the argument were compelling, the Bankruptcy Code does not allow 
favorable class treatment based on these moral considerations.  This Article 
addresses the two parts of the fairness argument for favorable treatment in 
reverse order. 
1. Categorical Discrimination and the Unfair Discrimination 
Standard 
Section 1129(b)(1), applicable in Chapter 9,155 prohibits unfair 
discrimination between classes.156  By implication, § 1129(b)(1) permits fair 
discrimination between classes.  The problem is that the Bankruptcy Code and 
its relevant legislative history are unclear as to what constitutes fair 
discrimination.157  By requiring a court to confirm a plan that does not unfairly 
discriminate against a rejecting class,158 the Code seems to invite the court to 
rely on its own standard of fairness.159  A court’s standard plausibly could be a 
moral standard based on desert or need.  After all, no Code provision instructs 
the court to rely on a different standard, and desert or need are moral 
considerations that arguably bear on fair treatment.  In addition, reliance on a 
moral standard does not exceed a court’s authority to invoke its equitable 
 
 154. See Beermann, supra note 22, at 1022; Andrew G. Biggs, The Looting of Detroit’s 
Pensions, AM. MAG., Feb. 16, 2014, available at http://www.aei.org/publication/the-looting-of-
detroits-pensions/; cf. Andrea Riquier, Pensions No Sacred Cow in Bankruptcy: Stockton 
Judge, INVESTOR’S BUS. DAILY (Oct. 2, 2014), http://news.investors.com/politics/100214-7200 
66-pensions-are-no-sacred-cow-in-bankruptcy-judge-says.htm (reporting that in Stockton’s 
bankruptcy, fairness arguments for favorable treatment of pensioners are a strong theme).  
However, in the Detroit bankruptcy, Judge Rhodes explicitly refused to consider the financial 
need of the retirees.  See Detroit Supplemental Opinion, supra note 5, at 178. 
 155. 11 U.S.C. § 901(a) (2012). 
 156. Id. § 1129(b)(1). 
 157. Cf. H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 417 (1977), reprinted in 1987 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6373 
(“The criterion of unfair discrimination is not derived from the fair and equitable rule or from 
the best interests of creditors test.  Rather it preserves just treatment of a dissenting class from 
the class’s own perspective.”). 
 158. See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(1). 
 159. See Detroit Supplemental Opinion, supra note 5, at 175. 
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powers to “carry out” the Code’s provisions.160  Section 1129(b)(1) requires 
the court to vet a plan for unfair discrimination, and consulting its own moral 
standards of fairness seemingly fulfills the requirement. 
However, closer scrutiny suggests that general moral considerations 
based on desert or need cannot properly inform the Code’s unfair 
discrimination standard.  To date, courts have not determined the fairness of 
favorable treatment based on moral bases such as a creditor’s desert or its 
need.  In fact, cases state that favorable treatment cannot be based on a 
creditor’s status or the terms of its claim.161  A reasonable inference from these 
cases is that a creditor’s desert or its need also does not make favorable 
treatment of the creditor fair.  A strong argument supports this proposition.  
The Code recognizes certain nonbankruptcy priorities and in a few instances 
creates others.162  Allowing a plan to favor a class of creditors over another 
coequal class in effect gives the favored class priority.  Because favorable 
treatment based on generally applicable moral considerations upsets priorities 
set by the Code, they cannot inform the fair-discrimination standard.  
Otherwise, these standards effectively supplant priorities decided on by 
Congress with a court’s own scheme of priorities. 
The comparison with the Code’s grant of the power of equitable 
subordination is close.  The power allows a court to subordinate a creditor’s 
claim to another claim or an interest.163  An unsubordinated claim or interest 
effectively has priority over the subordinated claim: it is satisfied in whole or 
part before the subordinated claim receives anything.164  Subordination and 
fair discrimination both upset priorities established by the Code.  The Code 
puts limits on the power of equitable subordination, and the Supreme Court 
has added an additional limit: equitable subordination must be based on 
“principles of equitable subordination,”165 not on any consideration that seems 
equitable to a court.  In addition, the Supreme Court allows subordination only 
on the basis of the equities of the particular case.166  This limit prevents a court 
from subordinating a claim based solely on its priority status.  A similar 
limitation prevents courts from favoring the claims of active and retired 
workers based on moral standards that are unrelated to the particular 
circumstances of these claimants. 
 
 160. See id. § 105(a). 
 161. See supra notes 117–19 and accompanying text. 
 162. See supra notes 52–56 and accompanying text. 
 163. See 11 U.S.C. § 510(c). 
 164. See DAVID G. EPSTEIN ET AL., BANKRUPTCY § 6-93, at 437 (1992). 
 165. 11 U.S.C. § 510(c)(1). 
 166. See United States v. Noland, 517 U.S. 535, 543 (1996) (“We do hold that . . . the 
circumstances that prompt a court to order equitable subordination must not occur at the level of 
policy choice at which Congress itself operated in drafting the Code.”). 
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Because bankruptcy courts draw an analogy between unfair 
discrimination and equitable subordination,167 it is useful to consider the 
Supreme Court’s logic in an important equitable-subordination case, United 
States v. Noland.168  Noland’s logic suggests that a court cannot approve a 
plan that gives more to the claims of retirees and active workers merely 
because these claimants are generally more deserving or needy than other 
claimants.  In Noland, the lower courts equitably subordinated a claim for a 
tax penalty.169  The lower courts reasoned that, although the tax penalty would 
ordinarily have priority over general unsecured claims as an administrative 
expense,170 general bankruptcy policy favors pecuniary losses over 
penalties.171 Like “unfair discrimination,” the power of equitable 
subordination seemed to these courts to allow a court to use its own sense of 
fairness or equity to subordinate a claim for a tax penalty.172  The Supreme 
Court disagreed.173 
The Court began by noting that the doctrine of equitable subordination 
predated its inclusion in the Code and that “[t]he normal rule of statutory 
construction is that if Congress intends for legislation to change the 
interpretation of a judicially created concept, it makes that intent specific.  The 
Court has followed this rule with particular care in construing the scope of 
bankruptcy codifications.”174  The Court then noted that prior to the adoption 
of the Code courts generally required that the subordinated party have 
engaged in inequitable conduct, that the inequitable conduct injured the other 
creditors or conferred an unfair advantage on the subordinated party, and that 
the subordination “not be inconsistent with the provisions of the Bankruptcy 
Act.”175  Acknowledging that Congress may have intended to “give courts 
some leeway to develop the doctrine,”176 the Court ultimately refused to 
decide whether equitable subordination required a showing of inequitable 
 
 167. See, e.g., In re Chapman, 146 B.R. 411, 418 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1992) (“What the debtor 
would be doing is equitably subordinating 90% of the claims of those creditors holding 
dischargeable claims to the nondischargeable student loans.”). 
 168. Noland, 517 U.S. 535. 
 169. See In re First Truck Lines, Inc., 141 B.R. 621, 629 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1992), aff’d sub 
nom. IRS v. Noland, 190 B.R. 827, 830 (S.D. Ohio 1993), aff’d sub nom. United States v. 
Noland (In re First Truck Lines, Inc.), 48 F.3d 210, 218 (6th Cir. 1995), rev’d, Noland, 517 
U.S. 535. 
 170. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 503(b)(1)(C), 507(a)(2). 
 171. See cases cited supra note 169. 
 172. Noland, 517 U.S. at 538 
 173. Id. 
 174. Id. at 539 (quoting Midlantic Nat’l Bank v. N.J. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 474 U.S. 494, 
501 (1986)). 
 175. Id. at 538–39. 
 176. Id. at 540. 
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conduct.177  It did not need to do so because it found it “improbable in the 
extreme” that Congress intended to deviate from this rule and allow courts to 
subordinate claims at a categorical level.178  If the provision allowed a court to 
subordinate taxes at a categorical level, “it would empower a court to modify 
the operation of the priority statute at the same level at which Congress 
operated when it made its characteristically general judgment to establish the 
hierarchy of claims in the first place.”179  In other words, “the distinction 
between characteristic legislative and trial court functions would simply be 
swept away, and the statute would delegate legislative revision, not authorize 
equitable exception.”180 
The Supreme Court’s logic in Noland suggests that courts cannot 
properly use the unfair discrimination standard to favor an entire category of 
claims, such as those of active and former workers.  Its rationale for barring 
categorical subordination also bars categorical discrimination.  Giving courts 
the power to discriminate without regard to the particular circumstances of the 
favored creditor class effectively alters the Code’s established priorities.  
Congress might have wished to grant courts some leeway to develop the unfair 
discrimination standard, but it is implausible that Congress intended to grant 
courts the power to discriminate between creditors on a categorical basis.  
Like equitable subordination, unfair discrimination requires the showing of an 
additional element particular to an individual creditor.181  While equitable 
subordination arguably requires proof of inequitable conduct, unfair 
discrimination requires a showing of contribution by members of the favored 
class or a demonstration that discrimination is necessary to the 
reorganization.182  Noland’s rationale does not allow a plan to favor a class 
solely because its members are retirees or active workers. 
A court’s vague disclaimer that it is not engaged in categorical 
discrimination does not establish that a plan’s favorable treatment of workers 
is fair. In Noland, the lower courts tried a similar tack with respect to equitable 
subordination.183  The Supreme Court rejected the approach of the lower 
courts: 
  
 
 177. See id. at 543. 
 178. Id. at 540–41. 
 179. Id. at 540. 
 180. Id. 
 181. See In re Monroe, 281 B.R. 398, 399 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2002) (standing for the 
proposition that courts generally consider facts and circumstances to determine unfair 
discrimination); In re Aztec Co., 107 B.R. 585, 589 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1989) (same). 
 182. See supra notes 29–119 and accompanying text. 
 183. See Noland, 517 U.S. at 541. 
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[A]lthough the court said that not every tax penalty would be equitably 
subordinated, that would be the inevitable result of consistent applications 
of the rule employed here, which depends not on individual equities but on 
the supposedly general unfairness of satisfying “postpetition, nonpecuniary 
loss tax penalty claims” before the claims of a general creditor.184 
 
In other words, a court could not properly reason that active and former 
workers, as a group, are more deserving of recovery than general creditors.185  
This categorical subordination is inherently legislative in nature.  Congress 
has explicitly granted some worker claims priority over general unsecured 
claims,186 but has chosen not to make this priority applicable in Chapter 9 or 
extend it to retirement claims.187  Therefore, creating a judicial priority for 
retirement claims is inconsistent with the Code. 
A court may, however, engage in truly individualistic reasoning, relying 
on findings about the particular circumstances of a municipality’s workers.  
For example, it could collect data on their other sources of income and wealth 
as well as their prospects for other employment.  Based on the particular 
financial circumstances of class members, the court could conclude that the 
plan’s favorable treatment of the class is fair.  Noland left unaddressed the 
question of whether Congress intended to allow courts to equitably 
subordinate claims without a showing of inequitable conduct.188  A similar 
question remains with respect to the unfair discrimination standard: does the 
unfair discrimination standard allow a plan to favor a class solely on the basis 
of the status or financial circumstances of its members?  The Court could 
allow the use of the unfair discrimination standard to favor workers or 
particularly needy creditors, but doing so would radically change the existing 
law. 
2. Fair Treatment 
Commentators who believe that the Code permits reorganization plans 
favoring retirees and active workers must believe that the favorable treatment 
is fair.  Fairness is a broad moral category, which includes desert and need.189  
 
 184. Id. (internal citations omitted). 
 185. See id. 
 186. See 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(4) (2012); id. § 901(a) (providing that § 507(a)(4) is 
inapplicable in Chapter 9). 
 187. See id. § 507(a)(4) (providing no provision for retirement claims); id. § 901(a) 
(providing that § 507(a)(4) is inapplicable in Chapter 9). 
 188. Noland, 517 U.S. at 543. 
 189. Cf. SHELLY KAGAN, NORMATIVE ETHICS 54–59 (1998) (describing fairness as somewhat 
of an amorphous notion); LOUIS KAPLOW & STEVEN SHAVELL, FAIRNESS VERSUS WELFARE 38–
39 (2002) (stating that fairness includes justice and related concepts, such as rights). 
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Accordingly, it might be argued that fairness permits or perhaps requires 
giving retirees and active workers favorable treatment because they deserve or 
need it.  Retirees and active workers have contributed services to the 
municipality and deserve to have their claims satisfied in light of their 
contribution.  In addition, given their modest financial position, retirees and 
active workers more urgently need to have their claims satisfied than other 
creditors.  Desert or comparative need therefore make it fair for the plan to 
favor them over the municipality’s other coequal creditors. 
This fairness case for favorable treatment based on desert or need is not 
conclusive.  First, consider desert.  Contribution arguably is a basis for 
deserving a benefit.190  Contribution, however, is not sufficient for favorable 
treatment.  This is because there might be others who also deserve the same 
benefit in light of their own contributions.  Although retirees and active 
workers might deserve payment of their claims based on their past services, 
bondholders and other contract creditors also have contributed to the 
municipality’s continued operations.  They also deserve to have their claims 
satisfied based on their contribution of capital, assets, or services.  Thus, 
retirees and active workers deserve better treatment only if their contribution 
makes them more deserving of payment than the municipality’s other 
creditors. 
It is hard to see how, in the abstract, retirees and active workers might be 
more deserving of payment than other contract creditors simply in light of 
their previous contributions to the municipality’s continued operations.  There 
are in fact two problems here.  First, it is not apparent that retirees and active 
workers deserve favorable treatment at all.  Both workers and other contract 
creditors have contributed to the municipality’s operations, and there is no 
reason a priori why one sort of contribution makes the contributor more 
 
 190. See, e.g., Julian Lamont, The Concept of Desert in Distributive Justice, 44 PHIL. Q. 45, 
60 (1994); cf. DAVID MILLER, MARKET, STATE, AND COMMUNITY 159 (1989).  In the text, we 
assume that contribution is a possible basis for moral desert.  The literature frequently 
distinguishes between moral desert and other forms of desert, such as economic desert.  See, 
e.g., Thomas Hurka, Desert: Individualistic and Holistic, in DESERT AND JUSTICE 45, 57–59 
(Serena Olsaretti ed., 2003).  This distinction makes contribution potentially relevant to 
economic desert, not to moral desert.  Given the divide, the deserved distribution of assets on 
account of contribution fits under economic desert.  For purposes of argument, we consider 
contribution a possible basis for moral desert.  Although a large topic, the frequently drawn 
distinction between moral and economic desert marks a difference in both the basis of desert 
(e.g., virtue versus contribution) and what is deserved (e.g., well being versus income or 
compensation).  The unfair discrimination standard allows a plan’s proposed distribution to 
favor a class only if the distribution is fair.  Whether the distribution is fair in turn is a matter of 
morality in a recognizable sense.  For this reason, we suppose that contribution can be a basis 
for moral desert that makes favorable treatment fair.  For the assertion that past service makes 
retirees deserving of full payment of their pensions, see Biggs, supra note 154. 
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deserving of payment than the other.  Both groups of contributors deserve 
payment.  The trouble is that the insolvent municipality’s plan proposes to 
distribute to classes amounts less than the class members are owed.  As a 
result, paying a particular creditor class more means paying another class less.  
Because plan assets are scarce, the treatment that one class deserves depends 
on the treatment another class deserves.191  Thus, retirees and active workers 
deserve a greater payout only if other contract creditor classes deserve a lower 
payout.  The second problem is that it is unclear how much favorable 
treatment is deserved, even if retirees and active workers are more deserving 
than other contract creditors.  For example, creditor A might be slightly more 
deserving than creditor B.  Still, desert might not allow paying A in full while 
paying B nothing.  Detroit’s bankruptcy plan proposes to pay in full the 
pension claims of the police and firemen, while paying 15% of the claims of 
city vendors with contract claims.192  Without a metric of deserved treatment, 
the fairness of a plan’s favorable treatment cannot be determined.  Given both 
problems, the case for favorable treatment based on desert has not been made. 
In Detroit’s bankruptcy the court relied in part on morality to determine 
the fairness of discrimination under § 119(b)(1).  It found that fairness 
requires resort to the court’s “conscience,” which is informed by the court’s 
experience and morality.193  According to Judge Rhodes, the city’s mission is 
to provide municipal services to residents and visitors, and the city’s retirees 
and active workers are part of the “backbone” of the structures that fulfill the 
city’s mission.194  The court concluded that the city’s interest in maintaining 
its relationships with active workers, and attracting new workers, makes the 
plan’s discrimination in favor of pension claims fair.195  This moral rationale 
for discrimination is odd, as it is based neither on necessity nor contribution.  
It is not based on necessity, because Judge Rhodes offered no evidence that 
the discrimination was needed to attract a work force.  He did not consider 
whether Detroit could have used other, cheaper, means of preserving its 
relationship with its existing employees and motivating and attracting skilled 
new employees.  Contribution also is absent because retirees, by assumption, 
are not in a position to contribute to the structures that supposedly fulfill the 
 
 191. See Shelly Kagan, Equality and Desert, in WHAT DO WE DESERVE? 298, 301–13 (Louis 
P. Pojman & Owen McLeod eds., 1999) (discussing notions of comparative desert); Thomas 
Hurka, The Common Structure of Virtue and Desert, 112 ETHICS 6, 30 n.25 (2001). 
 192. Corrected Fifth Amended Plan for the Adjustment of Debts of the City of Detroit at 36–
38 (Class 10), 42 (Class 14), In re City of Detroit, No. 13-53846 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. July 29, 
2014), available at http://www.detroitmi.gov/Portals/0/docs/EM/Bankruptcy%20Information/ 
6381.pdf. 
 193. See Supplemental Opinion, supra note 5, at 175. 
 194. See id. at 176. 
 195. See id. 
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city’s mission. At bottom, the court’s conclusion rests on an undefended 
intuition that morality allows discrimination in favor of pension claims. 
Now consider need.  A plausible view of fairness is that it requires giving 
priority to those who are worse off.  One way of understanding the view is that 
the well being of those who are worse off has greater weight than the well 
being of those in a better position.196  The basic idea is that benefitting people 
is morally more important, the worse their position.197  In short, there is a 
stronger reason to benefit people the worse off they are.  Their comparatively 
poor position makes satisfaction of their needs morally more urgent.198  This 
conception of fairness could justify giving retirees and active workers 
favorable treatment under the plan.  If the financial position of retirees and 
active workers is inferior to that of other creditors, and satisfying their claims 
against the municipality avoids making their financial position worse, their 
claims have more weight than other creditors’ claims.199  There is, therefore, a 
stronger reason to benefit retirees and active workers than there is to benefit 
the municipality’s other creditors.  Accordingly, a plan that favors their claims 
is fair. 
The fairness case for favoring retirees and active workers based on 
comparative need is not compelling.  Even if the operative view of fairness is 
unproblematic, there are problems with its application.  For one thing, 
individual retirees and active workers differ in their financial circumstances, 
according to the length of their job tenure, their investments, and their 
opportunities for alternative employment.  The variance in the financial 
positions of members within a class of retirees or active workers likely will be 
considerable.  As a result, the proper weight given to the claims of class 
members will differ, so that a plan’s favored treatment of the class could be 
fair with respect to some class members and unfair with respect to others.  
Thus, it cannot safely be concluded that fairness allows the plan to favor 
retirees and active workers as a group. 
Moreover, it is unclear that retirees and active workers are in an inferior 
financial position to other creditors.  Municipalities usually have many 
 
 196. Cf. THOMAS NAGEL, EQUALITY AND PARTIALITY 65–69 (1991); T. M. SCANLON, WHAT 
WE OWE TO EACH OTHER 223–29 (1998) (describing this principle of morality); LARRY S. 
TEMKIN, INEQUALITY 245–48 (1993) (describing a principle of benevolence independent of 
equality); Derek Parfit, Another Defense of the Priority View, 24 UTILITAS 399, 401 (2012) 
(describing such a principle of equality); Derek Parfit, Equality and Priority, 10 RATIO 202 
(1997) (describing a principle of equality and utility). 
 197. See NAGEL, supra note 196, at 66; Parfit, Equality and Priority, supra note 196, at 212–
13. 
 198. See THOMAS NAGEL, MORTAL QUESTIONS 123–24 (1991). 
 199. See Beermann, supra note 22, at 1020 (relying on this sort of claim in his conclusion 
that local pension cuts risk placing older Americans into poverty). 
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creditors, including tort creditors and different types of contract creditors.200  
A tort creditor who is an individual might be in a worse financial position than 
the municipality’s retirees and workers.  Similarly, although bondholders 
might be in better financial circumstances than retirees and current workers 
because they are wealthier or hold better-diversified investment portfolios, the 
same need not be true of other contract creditors.  And beyond the 
municipality’s creditors are employees of these creditors.  These employees 
might be in a worse financial position than the municipality’s workers, who 
enjoy more generous salaries and retirement benefits.  A failure of the 
municipality’s plan to favor creditors employing them could force the 
creditors to cease operations or reduce their own labor force.  Bankruptcy law 
takes into account only the interests of those holding claims against the 
debtor.201  Morality, however, considers the impact of a distribution of assets 
on those in poor financial positions, even if they are not creditors of the 
debtor.202  Thus, fairness requires taking into account the comparatively 
inferior position of these employees to give greater weight to the claims of 
their employers against the municipality.  For these reasons, the argument for 
favoring retirees and active employees based on comparative need is not 
established. 
III. EVADING THE UNFAIR DISCRIMINATION STANDARD 
Section II looked at whether a court could approve a plan providing a 
municipality’s active workers and retirees a greater recovery than general 
unsecured creditors if a class of these general unsecured creditors rejected the 
plan and raised an unfair discrimination objection.  This Section discusses 
whether a municipality could prevent the disfavored creditors from raising this 
objection. 
 
 200. Detroit’s debt adjustment plan creates seventeen classes of creditors.  Fifth Amended 
Plan for the Adjustment of Debts of the City of Detroit at 28–29, In re City of Detroit, No. 13-
53846 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. July 25, 2014), available at http://www.detroitmi.gov/Portals/0/ 
docs/EM/Bankruptcy%20Information/6257.pdf. Approximately 33,000 individuals who 
participate in Detroit’s pension plans have claims against the city.  See Disclosure Statement 
With Respect to Plan for the Adjustment of Debts of the City of Detroit at 4, In re City of 
Detroit, No. 13-53846 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. Feb. 21, 2014), available at http://www.detroitmi. 
gov/Portals/0/docs/EM/Bankruptcy%20Information/Disclosure%20Statement%20_Plan%20for 
%20the%20Adjustment%20of%20Debts%20of%20the%20City%20of%20Detroit.pdf. 
 201. See THOMAS H. JACKSON, THE LOGIC AND LIMITS OF BANKRUPTCY LAW 13–19 (1986) 
(clarifying that bankruptcy law does and should replace rules for individual debt collection with 
collective debt-collection rules). 
 202. See supra note 189 and accompanying text. 
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A. Claim Classification and Class Rejection 
A plan proponent may be able to prevent creditors from raising an unfair 
discrimination objection.  To do so, the plan must put claims held by creditors 
likely to reject the plan into a class of claims that will vote to accept it.  Under 
both Chapters 9 and 11, classes of claims vote on a plan by a dual voting 
rule.203  A class of claims accepts the plan if both a simple majority of claims 
voted and more than two-thirds in amount of voted claims vote to accept it.204  
Otherwise, the class has voted to reject the plan.  As a result, even if a creditor 
votes its claim to reject the plan, the class has accepted the plan if more than 
half of the claims voted and more than two-thirds in amount of voted claims 
voted to accept it.  Section 1129(b)(1)’s cramdown provision allows 
confirmation over the objection of a rejecting class only if the plan does not 
unfairly discriminate with respect to that class.205  The same restriction applies 
in Chapter 9.206  Thus, only claims in rejecting classes can object that the plan 
unfairly discriminates against them.  Rejecting members of an accepting class 
have no standing to raise the unfair discrimination objection to reorganization 
plans in Chapters 9 and 11.207 
Accordingly, the plan can mute the voice of rejecting claims by putting 
them in a class of claims that reliably will vote to accept the plan.  This 
strategy assures that the class will accept the plan and the unfair 
discrimination standard will not be applied to the plan’s treatment of that 
class.  Predictably, rejecting members of accepting classes objecting to their 
treatment under the plan will object to the classification of their claims.  They 
will make a three-step argument in support of their objection.  First, the 
rejecting class members will argue that their claims are improperly classified 
 
 203. See 11 U.S.C. § 1126(c) (2012); id. § 901(a) (incorporating § 1126(c) into Chapter 9). 
 204. Id. §§ 901(a), 1126(c).  If the plan promises nothing of value to a class, § 1126(g) 
deems the class to have rejected the plan and solicitation of the class’s vote is unnecessary.  Id. 
§ 1126(g). 
 205. Section 1129(b)(1) also limits absolute priority rule objections to claims or interests in 
classes that have rejected the plan.  See id. § 1129(b)(1); see also H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 413 
(1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6369. 
 206. See 11 U.S.C. § 901(a) (incorporating § 1129(b)).  The class-based restriction is not 
accidental.  Under § 1325(b)(1), an individual creditor has the right to raise the objection of 
unfair discrimination with respect to its claim.  Congress elected not to import an individual-
based restriction into Chapters 9 and 11.  Id. §§ 901(a), 1129(b)(1), 1325(b)(1). 
 207. See id. § 1129(b)(1) (applying the unfair discrimination standard only “with respect to 
each class of claims or interests that is impaired under, and has not accepted, the plan”); id. 
§ 901(a) (incorporating § 1129(b)(1)); see also In re City of Colo. Springs Spring Creek Gen. 
Improvement Dist., 187 B.R. 683, 690 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1995) (holding that a dissenting 
creditor was bound to the class’s vote because Chapter 9 provided no recourse). 
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with other claims in the class.208  Second, they will urge that, had their claims 
been properly classified, the class of which they were members would have 
voted to reject the plan.  Third, they will argue that the plan unfairly 
discriminates (or would do so) against that rejecting class. 
Because the unfair discrimination standards of Chapters 9 and 11 are 
class-based, the most important step in the argument is the first: that the plan 
improperly classifies the rejecting class members’ claims.209 If the 
classification of their claims is proper, the rejecting members have no right to 
object that their treatment under the plan unfairly discriminates against them.  
The rest of the argument, therefore, would fail.  Unlike the unfair 
discrimination standard, relevant Code provisions do not limit the parties who 
may object to a classification of claims.210  Thus, any party in interest has 
standing to contest the classification of claims in a class.  A member of an 
accepting class of claims may therefore object to the classification of its claim 
even if it cannot object to the treatment of the claim under the plan as unfair. 
The Bankruptcy Code’s regulation of claim classification is incomplete, 
and courts are divided on the issue.  The Code clearly prohibits the plan from 
placing claims with substantially different legal rights in the same class.211  It 
allows the plan to put small claims into separate classes when done for 
administrative convenience,212 even when the claims are substantially 
similar.213  However, the Code, says nothing about the permissibility of 
putting other substantially similar claims into different classes.  A minority of 
cases require that claims having the same legal character be put in the same 
class.214  Most courts permit the plan to classify similar claims separately as 
long as there is a legitimate business justification or “reasonable basis” for 
 
 208. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 1122 (providing for classification of claims or interests that are 
“substantially similar”). 
 209. Id. 
 210. See, e.g., id. §§ 1122(a), 1129(a)(1); cf. FED. R. BANKR. P. 3013 (“For the purposes of 
the plan . . . the court may, on motion after hearing . . . determine classes of creditors and equity 
security holders pursuant to § 1122 . . . .”). 
 211. See 11 U.S.C. § 1122(a). 
 212. See id. § 1122(b). 
 213. Id. 
 214. See Barnes v. Whelan (In re Barnes), 689 F.2d 193, 201 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (reversing the 
decision of the lower court, which required all similar claims to be placed in one class); In re 
Perkins, 55 B.R. 422, 424–25 (Bankr. N.D. Okla. 1985) (discussing a Fifth Circuit opinion that 
allowed separate classification of similar claims, despite the holding’s disagreement with other 
opinions).  The pre-Code classification rule under the Bankruptcy Act was the same.  See, e.g., 
In re L.A. Land & Invs., Ltd., 282 F. Supp. 448, 453–54 (D. Haw. 1968). 
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doing so.215  Although this test does not provide much guidance, cases often 
recite a slightly more specific rule: “thou shalt not classify similar claims 
differently in order to gerrymander an affirmative vote on a reorganization 
plan.”216  Gerrymandering is fairly easily found if the plan proponent alters the 
classification of a class in response to a third party’s purchase of some of the 
claims in the class.217  Its response to the sale suggests that the motive for the 
initial classification was to engineer the class’s vote to accept the plan.218  In 
other cases, evidence of the motivation for constructing a class is less clear. 
B. Good Faith and Class-Based Standing 
A rejecting member of a class that has voted to accept the plan 
sometimes challenges the plan on grounds independent of the classification of 
its claim.   It objects to the plan on the ground the plan has not been proposed 
in good faith as required by § 1129(a)(3), also applicable in Chapter 9.219  
Because the class-based standing requirement in § 1129(b)(1) does not apply 
to § 1129(a)(3), any party in interest may object that the plan was proposed in 
bad faith.  Thus, a rejecting member of an accepting class seemingly may 
argue that the plan is not offered in good faith because it unfairly 
discriminates against the class.  The contention appears plausible, because the 
predominant judicial test for the fairness of discrimination includes good faith 
as a requirement.220  Nonetheless, the Code’s structure suggests that the 
rejecting member should not be allowed to make this argument.  Sections 
1129(a)(3) and 1129(b)(1) are separate requirements.221  If possible, they 
therefore should be construed so that both are given effect.  Allowing the 
rejecting member of an accepting class to argue that it is bad faith to propose a 
plan that unfairly discriminates against it effectively eliminates the class-based 
standing requirement of § 1129(b)(1).  It would allow the class member to 
rehearse its case for unfair discrimination under the guise of good faith.  In 
 
 215. See Heartland Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Briscoe Enters., Ltd., II (In re Briscoe 
Enters., Ltd., II), 994 F.2d 1160, 1167 (5th Cir. 1993); In re Adelphia Commc’ns Corp., 368 
B.R. 140, 247 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2007). 
 216. See Travelers Ins. Co. v. Bryson Props., XVIII (In re Bryson Props., XVIII), 961 F.2d 
496, 502 (4th Cir. 1992); Phoenix Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Greystone III Joint Venture (In re 
Greystone III Joint Venture), 995 F.2d 1274, 1279 (5th Cir. 1991). 
 217. See CWCapital Asset Mgmt., LLC v. Burcam Capital II, LLC, Nos. 5:13-CV-278-F, 
5:13-CV-279-F, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 87900, at *14–15 (E.D.N.C. June 24, 2014). 
 218. See id. 
 219. 11 U.S.C. § 901(a) (2012). 
 220. See supra note 45 and accompanying text. 
 221. See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(1) (“[I]f all of the applicable requirements of subsection (a) of 
this section other than paragraph (8) are met with respect to a plan, the court . . . shall confirm 
the plan . . . if the plan does not discriminate unfairly . . . .”). 
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substance, the rejecting class member’s objection is one of unfair 
discrimination.  It should be treated as such, and not as an objection based on 
the plan proponent’s good faith. 
The unfair discrimination standards under §§ 1129(a)(3) and 1129(b)(1) 
can both be given effect easily.  If the rejecting member of an accepting 
class’s objection to the plan is one of bad faith, unrelated to the fairness of its 
treatment, the objection is allowable.  The rejecting member may raise the 
objection in its own right, whether or not it is a member of a rejecting class.  
If, however, the objection alleges bad faith based on the unfairness of 
treatment under the plan, it is not allowable.  Section 1129(b)(1) permits only 
classes that have rejected the plan to object to their treatment under the plan. 
C. Equal Treatment of Claims in a Class 
This Article argued above that a court should not allow a member of an 
accepting class to complain that classes of claims with substantially similar 
legal rights are receiving better treatment.222  The Code does not recognize an 
unfair discrimination objection made by a holder of a claim in an accepting 
class.223  However, § 1123(a)(4) requires the plan to treat claims in the same 
class the same way.224  The equal treatment rule of § 1123(a)(4) allows the 
holder of a claim in an accepting class to complain that other claims in the 
class are receiving better treatment.225  This preferential treatment may explain 
why the holders of the other claims in the class are voting for the plan. 
Consider a hypothetical.  Assume that the debtor is a small business that 
owes $100,000 to each of ten trade creditors, has a liquidation value of 
$250,000, and a going-concern value of $500,000.  The debtor could propose 
a plan that gives each trade creditor a note with a present value of $50,000, but 
this would leave no value for the shareholder.  Assume instead that the 
shareholder proposes a plan that places all of the trade creditors in the same 
class and pays each $25,000, the pro rata share of the firm’s liquidation value.  
The shareholder would retain all of the equity of the firm, in violation of the 
absolute-priority rule.  However, like unfair discrimination, only the holder of 
a claim that rejects the plan can raise an absolute priority objection.226  If the 
shareholder offers sufficiently attractive terms (a “bonus”) to the first seven 
 
 222. See supra notes 219–21 and accompanying text. 
 223. See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(1). 
 224. See id. § 1123(a)(4). 
 225. See id. § 1128(b) (allowing a party in interest to object to the confirmation of the plan); 
FED. R. BANKR. P. 3017(a) (requiring court to hold a hearing on a disclosure statement at which 
creditors’ objections can be considered); id. R. 3020(b)(2) (requiring court to rule on 
confirmation after notice and hearing of objection to plan). 
 226. See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(B). 
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trade creditors who commit to supply to the new firm and agree to vote for the 
plan, she should be able to secure enough votes.  A bonus of $26,000 should 
suffice because it leaves the accepting creditors better off than they would be 
under the plan with equal treatment, and this bonus would allow the manager 
to keep $68,000 in equity.227  The three creditors who were late to respond 
lose from this arrangement, as their individual recoveries drop by $25,000.  A 
creditor might object that the plan is not proposed in good faith, or that the 
debtor is not really using the debtor’s funds in the ordinary course of business.  
The better objection, however, is that the plan does not, in fact, treat all claims 
in the class equally as required by § 1123(a)(4). 
As a formal matter, the plan gives each claim the same dividend: 
$25,000, or 25% of each claim.  In substance, however, at least some of this 
dividend should be attributed to the prebankruptcy claim, violating the equal 
treatment rule of § 1123(b)(4).  Although a search reveals no cases applying 
this logic to find unequal treatment of claims within a class, courts sometimes 
look to substance over form to determine the amount that a creditor received 
on its claim.228  This is the logic that the Court used in Avon Park to hold that 
the debtor could not prove that the plan did not unfairly discriminate against 
some creditors.229  It is also the reasoning that other courts have applied to rule 
that plans awarding some claims more than other substantially similar claims 
do not unfairly discriminate because that additional recovery is really on 
account of some new contribution.230  For example, some courts have upheld a 
greater recovery for the holders of a claim when the holder has waived another 
claim.231 
 
 227. The accepting creditors are better off because they receive $51,000 (the $25,000 from 
the plan and the $26,000 bonus) instead of the $50,000 they would receive in a pro rata plan 
that gave all of the going-concern value to the creditors.  The manager can retain $68,000 in 
equity because the going-concern value is $500,000 and the firm pays a total of $432,000 to 
creditors ((7*$51,000) + (3*$25,000) = $432,000).  The manager may be able to extract much 
more equity if she can exploit a prisoner’s dilemma among the creditors. 
 228. See, e.g., ACC Bondholder Grp. v. Adelphia Commc’ns Corp. (In re Adelphia 
Commc’ns Corp.), 361 B.R. 337, 363–64 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (predicting that different payments 
contingent on whether class members voted for the plan likely violates § 1123(a)(4)); Finova 
Grp., Inc. v. BNP Paribas (In re Finova Grp., Inc.), 304 B.R. 630, 633–37 (D. Del. 2004) 
(indicating that some “utilization fees” labeled “interest” were paid while other “utilization 
fees” labeled “fees” were not paid, and the plan comported with the equal treatment mandate). 
 229. See Am. United Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. City of Avon Park, 311 U.S. 138, 147–48 (1940). 
 230. See, e.g., Markell, supra note 16, at 255–57. 
 231. See, e.g., In re HRC Joint Venture, 187 B.R. 202, 210–12 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1995); In 
re Shadow Bay Apartments, Ltd., 157 B.R. 363, 366 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1993) (holding that 
debtor had not met its burden of proving the absence of unfair discrimination, but not ruling on 
whether obtaining an offset as an administrative expense could be used as consideration for 
granting retention of partnership rights to one of two general partners in the debtor business). 
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There is, of course, the difficult matter of proof and the burden of 
offering it.  In the hypothetical above, this does not matter much because the 
bargain was explicit.  The debtor did not offer a bonus to the first seven trade 
creditors who agreed to supply goods and services, but explicitly required that 
they vote in favor of the plan.  At least some of the bonus should therefore be 
attributed to the vote, violating the equal treatment rule.  However, a better 
advised debtor would have dropped the explicit requirement for a vote in favor 
of the plan, as the favored trade creditors would realize that they could only 
collect on their contracts if the reorganization plan succeeded.  The bargain 
would be implicit rather than explicit.  Although in such cases the allocation 
of the burden of proof will matter a great deal, it is not insurmountable.  If the 
objecting party bears the burden, it may be able to show an implicit bargain by 
demonstrating that the trade creditors are receiving substantially above market 
terms for their goods, even taking into account the risk that they are dealing 
with a financially weak customer.  If the debtor bears the burden of proof, it 
can show that the terms of the deal are fair.232 
The next Section discusses In re City of Stockton, a recent case that 
illustrates a real-world example of this argument. 
D. Unfair Discrimination and Classification: In re City of Stockton 
Questions of claim classification are separate from questions of unfair 
discrimination.  The inquiry into proper classification asks whether there is a 
legitimate reason for putting a claim in a class, while the inquiry into unfair 
discrimination asks whether the plan’s treatment of the class is fair.  
Nonetheless, creditors objecting to the plan sometimes argue that the plan 
improperly classifies their claims because it treats the claims unfairly.  This 
objection makes the question of claim classification turn on an inquiry into 
unfair discrimination.  The argument appears in ongoing litigation in In re 
City of Stockton.233 
Stockton’s reorganization plan proposes to pay the pensions of its current 
and former workers in full while one bondholder, Franklin High Yield Tax-
Free Income Fund and Franklin High Yield Municipal Fund (collectively, 
Franklin), will recover about 0.25% of its unsecured claim ($94,000 of a $35 
million claim).234  Franklin perhaps negotiated aggressively, and the nominal 
recovery that Stockton’s plan offered it might be in retaliation for its hard 
 
 232. As a normative matter, it arguably is better to allocate the burden of proof to the plan 
proponent because the plan proponent has the option of splitting the claims into different classes 
and relying on the explicit fairness tests. 
 233. See Franklin Summary Objection, supra note 26, at 46–51. 
 234. See id. at 3–4, 6–7. 
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bargaining stance.235  However, there is a more compelling reason for 
Stockton to give Franklin at least a nominal amount: creditors who get nothing 
are conclusively presumed to vote against the plan.236  Although Franklin 
voted against the plan, enough other creditors in its class voted for the plan for 
the class to accept the plan.237  The other claims in Franklin’s class were the 
healthcare claims held by Stockton’s former workers.238  These claims were 
valued in a settlement agreement between Stockton and its current and former 
workers that required 1,100 holders to vote in favor of the plan.239 
Franklin raised several objections, some of which were based on notions 
of horizontal equality.  It argued that the plan gave the healthcare claims a 
greater recovery and therefore violated the requirement of equal treatment of 
claims in the same class.240  There are two parts to this argument.  First, 
Franklin argued that the plan violated the equal-treatment requirement because 
it provided the current and former workers with a combined recovery of over 
70% while Franklin gets just 0.25% on its claim.241  Bankruptcy law does not 
require equal treatment of creditors; rather, it requires equal treatment of 
claims.  Consider a creditor that owed $1 million on a loan secured by a 
$600,000 building.  The Code would divide the loan into a $600,000 secured 
claim and a $400,000 unsecured claim.  If the secured creditor received the 
same 10% recovery on its unsecured claim as the general unsecured creditors, 
the general unsecured creditors could not complain that the secured creditor is 
getting an additional $600,000 on its secured claim placed in a separate class.  
Franklin could have argued that the healthcare claims were not in fact distinct 
claims from the pension claims.  Rather, it argued that some of the return that 
the retirees purportedly received on account of their pension claim was 
actually received on account of their healthcare claims.242  This is the unequal 
treatment argument outlined in Section III.C.243 
Applying the unequal treatment argument to Stockton’s circumstances, 
the current and former workers are receiving more than a fraction of a percent 
on their healthcare claims.  It is just that as a formal matter, some of the 
 
 235. See id. at 57 (noting that “the City’s ‘offer’ of a de minimis ¼ cent-on-the-dollar 
recovery belies its insinuation that Franklin somehow made unreasonable demands in 
settlement negotiations over the Plan”). 
 236. See 11 U.S.C. § 1126(g) (2012). 
 237. See Franklin Summary Objection, supra note 26, at 33 & n.61. 
 238. Id. 
 239. Id. 
 240. See id. at 32. 
 241. See id. at 7, 19, 41. 
 242. See id. at 60–61. 
 243. See supra notes 222–32 and accompanying text. 
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compensation is paid in the form of a greater recovery on their pensions.244  
Making the argument more powerful, the recovery on the pensions and the 
healthcare claims were tied together as part of the same settlement 
agreement.245  Part of the consideration for the pension recovery came from 
the current and former workers’ agreement to vote their healthcare claims in 
favor of the plan.246  Suppose, however, that Stockton did not explicitly 
require an affirmative vote by its current and former workers and instead 
relied on the workers’ ability to see that an affirmative vote was in their self-
interest.  Franklin might still be able to prove that some of the pension 
recovery should be attributable to the healthcare claims by showing that the 
pension claims are receiving a dramatically higher payment than substantially 
similar claims.  Note that this is not the same as a direct challenge of unfair 
discrimination, as it requires an overlap between the holders of the claims in 
the favored class and the holders of the claims in the same class as the 
objecting creditor.  The objecting creditor must be able to argue that the debtor 
is, in fact, buying the favorable votes.  To see this, assume instead that 
Franklin were placed in a class consisting solely of similar bonds and that the 
holders of the bonds had no overlap with the holders of the pension claims, 
and that the holders of the bonds still voted in favor of the class (perhaps 
because they thought that the workers deserved more as a moral matter).  
Franklin would not be able to raise an equal treatment argument because it 
cannot argue that the debtor is effectively buying the votes of the bondholders. 
While we find substantial merit in the argument that Stockton’s plan did 
not offer Franklin’s unsecured claim treatment equal to that received by the 
workers’ health claims, Judge Klein did not.  He stated that the plan complied 
with § 1123(a)(4)’s requirement of equal treatment without directly addressing 
Franklin’s argument.247  This is somewhat surprising given that he clearly 
understood that creditors are willing to sacrifice a return on one claim in order 
to bargain for a hire return on another.  In fact, he relied on this very argument 
to justify the preferential treatment afforded to worker pensions, arguing that 
the workers were indeed sacrificing as well by accepting a reduction in their 
wages and other benefits.248 
Franklin had a second argument as to why the workers were receiving 
more for their healthcare claims.  It argued that the plan overvalued the size of 
the healthcare claims by failing to use the present value of future costs.249  
 
 244. Id. at 41. 
 245. Id. at 41–42. 
 246. Id. at 33. 
 247. See Stockton Transcript, supra note 6, at 33. 
 248. Id. at 21, 26, 28, 34–35. 
 249. See Franklin Summary Objection, supra note 26, at 60. 
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Failing to discount future claims would be an obvious violation of bankruptcy 
norms,250 raising the question of why the city would do this.  Overstating the 
size of the claims would not have a material effect on the amount paid to the 
workers and retirees.  Franklin alleges that the failure to discount future 
amounts roughly doubled the size of the healthcare claims.251  However, the 
recovery rate on these claims in this class was essentially zero (0.25%),252 and 
doubling nothing still gives you nothing.253  The explanation for Stockton’s 
failure to discount probably lies in the voting mechanics.  Stockton probably 
feared that some current and former workers would vote against the plan 
because they believed they were entitled to have both their pension and 
healthcare claims paid in full.  In this event, with Franklin’s opposition, 
Stockton would have to convince a sizeable number of current and former 
workers to return their ballots, and this may have been hard to do.  Otherwise, 
under the applicable voting rule, the amount of the claims within the class 
voting to accept the plan would be insufficient for the class to have accepted 
the plan.254  By inflating the size of the workers’ claims, Stockton eased its 
task of soliciting sufficient votes to ensure the class’s acceptance of the plan. 
Franklin spent a great deal of time objecting to the placement of its claim 
in the same class as the healthcare claims and in a class separate from the 
pension obligations and several other bond series that received substantially 
greater recoveries than Franklin.255  The reason is unsurprising in light of the 
discussion in Section III.A above.256  If Franklin could convince the court that 
all of the claims belonged in the same class, then the better treatment received 
by the holders of the pensions and the other bonds would violate the 
requirement that all claims in a class receive the same treatment.  If Franklin 
could convince the court that their claims belonged in a separate class from 
the healthcare claims, it could vote to reject the plan and invoke the unfair 
discrimination standard. 
 
 250. See 11 U.S.C. § 502(b)(2) (2012); Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. Belfance (In re CSC 
Indus., Inc.), 232 F.3d 505, 507–08 (6th Cir. 2000) (stating that the allowed amount of 
unmatured future liabilities must be discounted to present value); Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. 
v. CF&I Fabricators (In re CF&I Fabricators of Utah, Inc.), 150 F.3d 1293, 1300 (10th Cir. 
1998) (same). 
 251. See Franklin Summary Objection, supra note 26, at 61. 
 252. Id. at 7. 
 253. We may be understating the importance of the effect of this misstatement on the pro 
rata share that Franklin would receive.  After Judge Klein affirmed the city’s valuation of the 
claims, Franklin objected on the grounds that this would reduce its recovery.  See Stockton 
Transcript, supra note 6, at 44. 
 254. See 11 U.S.C. § 1126(c); § 901(a) (incorporating § 1126(c) into Chapter 9). 
 255. See Franklin Summary Objection, supra note 26, at 30–41. 
 256. See supra notes 203–18 and accompanying text. 
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Finally, Franklin contended that the classification of its claim was 
improper because the claim’s treatment under Stockton’s plan unfairly 
discriminated against it.257 The contention assumes that the unfair 
discrimination standard informs the test for the proper classification of claims.  
Stockton clearly engineered its classes to obtain a desirable voting outcome 
within each class.  A court applying the no-gerrymandering test, therefore, 
must ask whether the debtor has a valid “independent” reason to separately 
classify claims.258  Stockton could respond that it has an independent reason: it 
wishes to pay its retirement obligations in full to preserve the goodwill of its 
current and future workers.  This, of course, is the central argument in the 
unfair discrimination analysis.  In this case, whether the classification is 
permissible turns on whether the plan’s favorable treatment of Stockton’s 
workers is fair to Franklin.  Franklin’s argument was anticipated by the 
leading bankruptcy treatise: 
 
[T]he separate classification, when coupled with materially different 
economic treatment of the classes, can have the effect of unfair discrimination 
among similarly situated creditors.  Classes may, by voting for the plan, 
accept the different treatment, but courts should be cautious about carrying 
this reasoning too far.  Although the “unfair discrimination” standard 
technically applies only under section 1129(b) when a class has not accepted 
the plan, a court should consider a confirmation objection based on alleged 
improper classification raised by a dissenting creditor in an accepting class if 
the combination of separate classification and materially different treatment 
results in substantially different economic effects between the two classes and 
the purpose and effect is other than the debtor’s good faith effort to protect its 
future business operations.259 
 
The objection to claim classification based on unfair discrimination 
should not be allowed. Allowing the results of an inquiry into unfair 
discrimination to determine whether classification is proper not only confuses 
the question of whether the classification of a claim has a legitimate basis with 
the question of whether the treatment of the claim under the plan is unfair.  
Whether the plan has constructed classes to engineer acceptance of the plan is 
one thing; whether the plan’s treatment of a rejecting class is fair is another.  
More importantly, it enables the opponent of the classification to evade 
§ 1129(b)(1)’s class-based standard for unfair discrimination.  Although 
§ 1129(b)(1) prohibits a rejecting member of an accepting class from 
 
 257. See Franklin Summary Objection, supra note 26, at 46–51. 
 258. See supra notes 215–18 and accompanying text. 
 259. 7 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 50, ¶ 1122.03[3][a], at 1122-13 (citing In re 
Jersey City Med. Ctr., 817 F.2d 1055 (3d Cir. 1987)). 
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contesting its treatment under the plan as unfair, the objector can raise the 
same objection as a ground for contesting the classification of its claim.260  
This effectively renders § 1129(b)(1)’s class-based unfair discrimination 
standard inapplicable.  The issue is not merely a “technical” one of fitting the 
standard to the right Code provision, as the quotation above suggests.  It is 
whether courts should allow a creditor to avoid Congress’s carefully 
considered restriction on standing to object to a treatment under the plan as 
fair.261  The class-based restriction eliminates the holdup power of the 
objecting class member, because the objector cannot hold the plan hostage to 
its objection based on unfair discrimination.  Allowing the same objection as a 
challenge to classification effectively reinstates this holdup power, thereby 
increasing the bankruptcy costs of reorganization. 
CONCLUSION 
The Bankruptcy Code incorporates a standard of unfair discrimination 
that it leaves unclear.  Nonetheless, bankruptcy’s fair discrimination standard 
has a determinable content that remains unchanged in Chapter 9.  The 
standard does not allow the plan proponent the complete discretion to favor 
one class over other coequal classes.  Instead, case law requires the plan to 
treat classes equally unless the favorable treatment of a class falls within a 
limited number of judicially recognized categories.  These categories limit the 
types of circumstances in which a municipal reorganization plan may deviate 
from bankruptcy’s requirement that coequal classes receive the same 
proportionate distribution.  Although municipal workers and retirees are 
sympathetic creditors who attract strong political support, none of the 
circumstances that allow a plan to favor them apply.  Case law aside, the 
normative case for favoring them is not compelling.  Considerations of 
fairness, such as those based on desert or need, do not support treating retirees 
and active workers better than other creditors in a municipality’s bankruptcy. 
 
 260. See FED. R. BANKR. P. 3013 (providing that the court may, on motion, determine proper 
classification under § 1122). 
 261. See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(1) (2012). 
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